更新时间：2020-07-31 09:54:11
封面
版权页
作者简介
Preface
献言
Acknowledgments
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 A Regime Change Model with Speculators and Stakeholders
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Static Model
2.3 Equilibrium
2.4 Comparative Statics
2.5 Two-Stage Games
2.6 Regime Stability in Dynamic Settings
2.7 Concluding Remarks
2.8 Appendix
Chapter 3 Interventions Policies as Public Signals in A Dynamic Global Game
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Model
3.3 Equilibrium
3.4 Interventions
3.5 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the IMF
3.6 Concluding Remarks
3.7 Appendix: Proofs
Chapter 4 The Informational Role of Winner's Actions in a Repeated Beauty Contest Game(1)
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Model
4.3 Equilibrium
4.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
4.5 An Empirical Study: Miss Korea Pageant
4.6 Conclusions
4.7 Appendix
Chapter 5 Conclusions
Bibliography
