第8章 Principles(1)

There is another fault that stops or misleads men in their knowledge,Which I have also spoken something of but yet is necessary to mention here again,that we may examine it to the bottom and see the root it springs from,and that is a custom of taking up with principles that are not self-evident and very often not so much true.It is not unusual to see men rest their opinions upon foundations that have no more certainty nor solidity than the propositions built on them and embraced for their sake.Such foundations are these and the like,viz.:the founders or leaders of my party are good men and therefore their tenets are true;it is the opinion of a sect that is erroneous,therefore it is false;it has been long received in the world,therefore it is true;or it is new,and therefore false.

These and mans the like,which are by no means the measures of truth and falsehood,the generality of men make the standards by which they accustom their understanding to judge.And thus they falling into a habit of determining of truth and falsehood by such wrong measures,it is no wonder they should embrace error for certainty and be very positive in things they have no ground for.

There is not any Who pretends to the least reason but,when any of these his false maxims are brought to the test,must acknowledge them to be fallible and such as he will not allow in those that differ from him;and yet after he is convinced of this you shall see him go on in the use of them and the very next occasion that offers argue again upon the same grounds.Would one not be ready to think that men are willing to impose upon themselves and mislead their own understanding who conduct them by such wrong measures even after they see they cannot be relied on?But yet they will not appear so blameable as may be thought at first sight;for I think there are a great many that argue thus in earnest and do it not to impose on themselves or others.They are persuaded of what they say and think there is weight in it,though in a like case they have been convinced there is none;but men would be intolerable to themselves and contemptible to others,if they should embrace opinions without any ground and hold what they could give no manner of reason for.True or false,solid or sandy,the mind must have some foundation to rest itself upon,and,as I have remarked in another place,it no sooner entertains any proposition but it presently hastens to some hypothesis to bottom it on;till then it is unquiet and unsettled.

So much do our own very tempers dispose us to a right use of our understandings,if we would follow as we should the inclinations of our nature.

In some matters of concernment,especially those of religion,men are not permitted to be always wavering and uncertain;they must embrace and profess some tenets or other;and it would be a shame,nay a contradiction,too heavy for anyone's mind to lie constantly under,for him to pretend seriously to be persuaded of the truth of any religion and yet not to be able to give any reason of one's belief or to say anything for his preference of this to any other opinion.

And therefore they must make use of some principles or other,and those can be no other than such as they have and can manage;and to say they are not in earnest persuaded by them and do not rest upon those they make use of.is contrary to experience and to allege that they are not misled when we complain they are.

If this be so,it will be urged,why then do they not rather make use of sure and unquestionable principles rather than rest on such grounds as may deceive them and will,as is visible,serve to support error as well as truth?

To this I answer,the reason why they do not make use of better and surer principles is because they cannot;but this inability proceeds not from w ant of natural parts (for those few whose case that is are to be excused)but for want of use and exercise.Few men are from their youth accustomed to strict reasoning and to trace the dependence of any truth in a long train of consequences to its remote principles and to observe its connection;and he that by frequent practice has not been used to this employment of his understanding,it is no more wonder that he should not,when he is grown into years,be able to bring his mind to it,than that he should not be on a sudden able to grave or design,dance on the ropes,or write a good hand who has never practiced either of them.

Nay,the most of men are so wholly strangers to this,that they do not so much as perceive their leant of it.They dispatch the ordinary business of their callings by rote,as we say,as they have learnt it,and if at any time they miss success,they impute it to anything rather than want of thought or skill;that they conclude (because they know no better)they have in perfection.

Or if there be any subject that interest or fancy has recommended to their thoughts,their reasoning about it is still after their own fashion;be it better or worse,it serves their turns and is the best they are acquainted with;and therefore when they are led by it into mistakes and their business succeeds accordingly,they impute it to any cross accident or default of others rather than to their own want of understanding;that is what nobody discovers or complains of in himself.