第43章
Their success, if it could have been effected without lesion to the church, would have set Europe forward some two or three hundred years, and probably saved it from the schisms of the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries.But it is easy to be wise after the event.The fact is, that during the period when feudalism was in full vigor, the king was merely a shadow; the people found their only consolation in religion, and their chief protectors in the monks, who mingled with them, saw their sufferings, and sympathized with them, consoled them, carried their cause to the castle before the feudal lord and lady, and did, thank God, do something to keep alive religious sentiments and convictions in the bosom of the feudal society itself.Whatever opinions may be formed of the monastic orders in relation to the present, this much is certain, that they were the chief civilizers of Europe, and the chief agents in delivering European society from feudal barbarism.
The aristocracy have been claimed as the natural allies of the throne, but history proves them to be its natural enemies, whenever it cannot be used in their service, and kings do not consent to be their ministers and to do their bidding.Apolitical aristocracy has at heart only the interests of its order, and pursues no line of policy but the extension or preservation of its privileges.Having little to gain and much to lose, it opposes every political change that would either strengthen the crown or elevate the people.The nobility in the French Revolution were the first to desert both the king and the kingdom, and kings have always found their readiest and firmest allies in the people.The people in Europe have no such bitter feelings towards royalty as they have towards the feudal nobility--for kings have never so grievously oppressed them.In Rome the patrician order opposed alike the emperor and the people, except when they, as chivalric nobles sometimes will do, turned courtiers or demagogues.They were the people of Rome and the provinces that sustained the emperors, and they were the emperors who sustained the people, and gave to the provincials the privileges of Roman citizens.
Guaranties against excessive centralism are certainly needed, but the statesman will not seek them in the feudal organization of society--in a political aristocracy, whether founded on birth or private wealth, nor in a privileged class of any sort.Better trust Caesar than Brutus, or even Cato.Nor will he seek them in the antagonism of interests intended to neutralize or balance each other, as in the English constitution.This was the great error of Mr.Calhoun.No man saw more clearly than Mr.Calhoun the utter worthlessness of simple paper constitutions, on which Mr.Jefferson placed such implicit reliance, or that the real constitution is in the state itself, in the manner in which the people themselves are organized; but his reliance was in constituting, as powers in the state, the several popular interests that exist, and pitting them against each other--the famous system of checks and balances of English states men.He was led to this, because be distrusted power, and was more intention guarding against its abuses than on providing for its free, vigorous, and healthy action, going on the principle that "that is the best government which governs least." But, if the opposing interests could be made to balance one another perfectly, the result would be an equilibrium, in which power would be brought to a stand-still; and if not, the stronger would succeed and swallow up all the rest.The theory of checks and balances is admirable if the object be to trammel power, and to have as little power in the government as possible; but it is a theory which is born from passions engendered by the struggle against despotism or arbitrary power, not from a calm and philosophical appreciation of government itself.The English have not succeeded in establishing their theory, for, after all, their constitution does not work so well as they pretend.The landed interest controls at one time, and the mercantile and manufacturing interest at another.They do not perfectly balance one another, and it is not difficult to see that the mercantile and manufacturing interest, combined with the moneyed interest, is henceforth to predominate.The aim of the real statesman is to organize all the interests and forces of the state dialectically, so that they shall unite to add to its strength, and work together harmoniously for the common good.