第33章 Lecture IV.(10)

[5] Kelso v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 528, 536, 537; California Packing Co. v. Kelly S. & D. CO., 228 N. Y. 49.

[6] Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," 21 Harvard L. R. 383, 387.

[7] Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," p. 295; cf.

pp. 294, 296.

[8] See his Treatise on Evidence, passim .

[9] Jhering, "Zweck im Recht," 5 Modern Legal Philosophy Series; also Gény, op. cit. , vol. I, p. 8; Pound, "Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 25 Harvard L. R. 140, 141, 145; Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia L. R. 603, 609.

[10] Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Columbia L. R. 603, 609.

[11] Cf. Brütt, supra , pp. 161, 163.

[12] Saleilles, "De la Personnalité Juridique,"p. 497. "Avec Jhering nous resterons des réalistes, mais avec lui aussi nous serons des idéalistes, attachés à l'idée de but et de finalité sociale."--Saleilles, p. 516.

[13] Cf. Ehrlich, "Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts," pp. 366, 368; Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 212; Gray, "Nature and Sources of Law," secs. 628, 650; Vinogradoff, "Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence," p. 135.

[14] Ehrlich, supra .

[15] Cf. Gény, op. cit. , vol. I, p. 263, sec. 92.

[16] For a clear and interesting summary, see Brütt, supra, p. 101, et seq. ; cf. Gény, op. cit. , vol. I, p. 221; and contrast Flavius, op. cit. , p. 87.

[17] Brütt, supra , pp. 101-111.

[18] Stammler, "Richtiges Recht," s. 162, quoted by Brütt, supra , p. 104.

[19] "Nature and Sources of Law," sec. 610.

[20] Supra , p. 139

[21] Barnes, "Durkheim's Political Theory," 35Pol. Science Quarterly, p. 239.

[22] Ibid. ; cf. Barker, "Political Thought from Spencer to Today," pp. 151, 153, 175.

[23] Vander Eycken, "Méthode Positive de l'Interprétation juridique," p. 59; Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik,"p. 187.

[24] "La Renaissance du droit naturel," p. 181.

[25] "He may intervene only to supplement the formal authorities, and even in that field there are limits to his discretion in establishing rules of law. He may neither restrict the scope of the general principles of our juridical organization, explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, nor may he lay down detailed regulations governing the exercise of given rights, by introducing delays, formalities, or rules of publicity."--Charmont, supra , transl. in 7 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, p. 120, sec.

91. Cf. Jhering, "Law as a Means to an End" (5 Modern Legal Philosophy Series: Introduction by W. M. Geldart, p. xlvi): "The purposes of law are embodied in legal conceptions which must develop in independence and cannot at every step be called upon to conform to particular needs. Otherwise system and certainty would be unattainable. But this autonomy of law, if it were only because of excess or defects of logic, will lead to a divergence between law and the needs of life, which from time to time calls for correction.

. . . How far if at all the needful changes can or ought to be carried out by judicial decisions or the development of legal theory, and how far the intervention of the legislator will be called for, is a matter that will vary from one legal territory to another according to the accepted traditions as to the binding force of precedents, the character of the enacted law, and the wider or narrower liberty of judicial interpretation."[26] Cf. Berolzheimer, 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series, pp. 167, 168.

[27] Flavius, supra , p. 49; 2 Pollock and Maitland, "History of English Law," p. 561.

[28] Smith, "Surviving Fictions," 27 Yale L. J., 147, 317; Ehrlich, supra , pp. 227, 228; Saleilles, "De la PérsonnalitéJuridique," p. 382.

"Lorsque la loi sanctionne certains rapports juridiques, à l'exclusion de tels autres qui en différent, il arrive, pour tels ou tels rapports de droit plus ou moins similaires auxquels on sent le besoin d'étendre la protection légale, que l'on est tenté de procéder, soit par analogie, soit par fiction. La fiction est une analogie un peu amplifiée, ou plutôt non dissimulée."--Saleilles, supra .

[29] "The Path of the Law," 10 Harvard L. R. 466.

[30] Op. cit. , vol. II, p. 77.

[31] Ehrlich has the same thought, "Die juristische Logik," p. 312.

[32] Professor in the University of Brussels.

[33] P. 401, sec. 239.

[34] On this subject, see Sherman, "Roman Law in the Modern World"; Scrutton, "Roman Law Influence," I Select Essays in Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. 208.

[35] Pollock and Maitland's "History of English Law," 88, 114; Maitland's "Introduction to Gierke," supra , p. xii.

[36] Cf. Pound, 27 Harvard L. R. 731, 733.

[37] Austin, "Jurisprudence," vol. I, 37, 104;Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 54; W. Jethro Brown, "The Austinian Theory of Law," p. 311.

[38] Sec. 602.

[39] Cf. Gray, supra , secs. 276, 366, 369.

[40] 29 Yale L. J. 394.

[41] Cf. Beale, "Conflict of Laws," p. 153, sec.

129.

[42] Salmond, "Jurisprudence," p. 157; Sadler, "Relation of Law to Custom," pp. 4, 6, 50; F. A. Geer, 9 L. Q. R. 153.

[43] Duguit, "Law and the State," 31 Harvard L.

R. I; Vinogradoff, "The Crisis of Modern Jurisprudence," 29 Yale L. J.

312; Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," pp. 41, 42.