3 The Challenges to China's Security Strategy

According to MRT, rising powers inevitably face challenges on both domestic and international levels; and China is no exception. The combination of international and domestic factors is highly complicated. They are of different importance towards the rise of China under different conditions.

3.1 External Threat Is Still Insufficient to Subvert the Rise of China

Concerning China's current international status, there are a great many international factors that impede the rise of China, yet none of them are powerful enough to subvert it. The US is the greatest international hindrance to China's rise. However, the US is unable to subvert China's rise. It can only, at most, cause challenges and difficulties. According to the mainstream opinion of US academia, the driving force of China's rise originates in the country itself. The “Pivot to Asia” may allow the US to continue its dominance in the Asia pacific region by isolating China and creating external challenges in economics and security, however, the US is unable to prevent China from rising.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the US aims to persuade countries to balance against China, thus polarizing the region. To achieve this aim, the US has employed strategies of alignment. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton reiterated that the strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific aimed to consolidate cooperation with long-term allies, foster relations with new allies, and strengthen the dialogue with opponents.

Apart from the US, resistance also comes from Japan's Abe Administration and its China policy. Yet this resistance is of limited capacity. It will decrease as the gap between the comprehensive national strength of China and Japan widens. From a long-term perspective, there will be possibilities for China and Japan to improve their relationship, as the Japanese government is likely to adjust its China policy after the Abe administration.

3.2 Domestic challenges in China Threaten China's Rise

As external factors are not capable of subversion, domestic challenges have a decisive impact on the rise of China. Having noticed the growing idleness of government officials, the Central Committee of CPC pointed out that “currently there are three types of idling among government officials: the inability to work reasonably due to insufficient capability; the unwillingness to work responsibly due to inadequate motivation; and the fear of working responsibly due to a lack of sense of responsibility.” The reason why most people are afraid to take on responsibilities is that they are afraid to make mistakes. It happens to government officials as well as business entrepreneurs. According to an authoritative interview in the People's Daily, currently, “investment in the private sector is plummeting” and it is necessary to“enable entrepreneurs to have ‘fixed property' as well as ‘long-lasting perseverance' …and it is not advisable to rake up the past, so as to provide entrepreneurs with a sense of security.” People who are conservative will choose not to work responsibly, while those who are aggressive will make “fake, exaggerated and empty” slogans. Such slogans have resulted in tremendous damages to the development of China, and should still be prevented in the future from inhibiting China's rise.

“Fake, exaggerated and empty” slogans damage the strategic security of China in various aspects. In foreign affairs, one symptom of such slogans is to make international commitments and propose goals of foreign strategies that are beyond one's own national strength. MRT believes that strategic reputation is at the core of being a moral power. As they are difficult to achieve, commitments and goals beyond national strength could easily damage a country's international strategic reputation. At present, China is being asked by developing countries for more assistance in larger amounts. For the rise of a country, it is helpful to provide outbound assistance compatible with its national strength, yet stressful to offer assistance beyond one's national strength. MRT argues for preventing the disturbance of “fake, exaggerated and empty” claims on diplomatic work. The most effective means is to stipulate national interests and strategic goals based on corresponding national strength. This method prevents damage to the international strategic reputation and wins more support from the international community. For the rising power, if it wishes to be regarded as more moral than the dominant country, it has to build a better strategic reputation: the better the reputation, the smaller the international resistance, and vice versa.

3.3 “Taiwan Independence Movement” Will Grow into a Pressing Issue for the Rise of China

Apart from the separatism forces in Tibet and Xinjiang, we are also witnessing the rise of an independence movement in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Consequently, separatism poses a security threat towards China's rise. The force of the Taiwan independence movement might receive more support from the US after Tsai Ing-wen took office. If the force of such a movement has gained ground once again, it may even lead to a systemic effect of “integrated actions on three seas”, namely the the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In these three strategic areas, the Taiwan administration may come into conflict with mainland China. China needs to be prepared in advance for situations like joint humanitarian rescue within territorial water around Taiping Island by Taiwan, Japan and US.

In the 1990's, the issue of Taiwan was one of the most significant hindrances on Sino-US relations. It was somewhat mitigated after Ma Ying-jeou took office, yet as the Democratic Progressive Party took office, it may once again rise to be the central issue in China-US relations and the most pressing security threat for China.

3.4 The Conflicts in the South China Sea Might be Long-lasting

The US rebalancing strategy involves, to a large extent, the strategic relations between China and Southeast Asian countries. Both China and the US are fighting for support from countries around the South China Sea. Currently, the US is supported by Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, China by Laos and Cambodia, with Thailand and Myanmar remaining relatively neutral.

China has three categories of strategic interests in the: economic interests, including fisheries and hydrocarbons; sovereignty of the islands, and strategic relations with neighboring countries. The first two categories receive more media attention in China. However, even if the fishery and hydrocarbons did not exist in the South China Sea, or could not be utilized by China, it will not determine the success of China's rise.Considering that all the islands in that region are under the de facto control of related countries, it could be deduced that China cannot change the status quo without starting wars and seizing the islands by force. Since the de facto control of the islands is fixed,the impact of de jure control on China's rise is also fixed-a constant, rather than a variable. In contrast, the standing of the ten ASEAN countries in China-US competition is a significant strategic variable, worthy for China to win over with strategic actions.

According to MRT, it is possible for China to improve its strategic relations with ASEAN countries through its own efforts and adjustment in strategies, thereby changing the political configuration in the conflict of the South China Sea. At present, China has fewer supporters than the US. If this is reversed, then there will be a much better strategic security environment for China to rise. This strategic support seems to be of greater importance for the rise of China than economic interests and de facto control over islands.

3.5 DPRK Nuclear Issue Is Difficult to Solve in a Short Term

There are two points of interests for China on the DPRK nuclear issue: to maintain a peaceful Korean peninsula, and to have a nuclear-free peninsula. When these points are in conflict, it is necessary for China to rearrange these priorities. Currently, China is able to prevent a war on the peninsula, but unable to eradicate the nuclear weapons of DPRK. On the condition of maintaining a peaceful peninsula, there are four options for China-DPRK relations: 1) a nuclear DPRK friendly to China; 2) a nuclear DPRK unfriendly to China; 3) a nuclear-free DPRK friendly to China and 4) a nuclearfree DPRK unfriendly to China. Options three and four are infeasible, as the DPRK government has engaged in a strategy to simultaneously develop both the economy and a nuclear arsenal. China is thus restricted to options 1 and 2, based on its current national strength. Option one might turn the DPRK into a country like Pakistan, while option two might turn it into a country like India. Using categorization to define national interest priorities on this issue could also be applied to issues with national interests in other areas.