Ⅴ Import/Export Control on and Non-Proliferation of Controlled Chemicals

In terms of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and their precursors as well as technical equipment, the Chinese government prioritizes the significance of the CWC and has made positive efforts under such framework toward fulfilling objectives of Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council. In 2016, MIIT, MOFCOM and GAC jointly published a Notice on the List of Additional Dual-Use Items and Technologies Prohibited from Exporting to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

China has been strict in complying with regulations on transfer of scheduled chemicals under the Convention and applied globally accepted schemes and standards relating to license management, control list and end use certificate of controlled chemicals in terms of import and export in order to strictly manage them. Measures such as designated operators and production source control have been adopted for the import and export of controlled chemicals to reduce proliferation risks. In 2016, NCIO tightened its review on applications for controlled chemicals import and export with a total of 655 approved applications. Considering changes in global trade of controlled chemicals and for better regulation, NOI worked with MOFCOM and GAC in changing the HS codes of S2 controlled chemicals（Item 4 of Type B）. Two new S2 controlled chemicals（butyl methylphosphinate, and methylphosphonic acid, compound with guanylurea）were listed clearly under corresponding HS codes. Production technologies of S1, S2 and S3 controlled chemicals together with the special equipment for S1, S2 and S3 controlled chemicals have been included into the Import and Export License Management Catalogue for Dual-Use Items and Technologies to strengthen the management and control of both technologies and equipment.

Implementing authorities at various levels all enhanced source control, continuously organized non-proliferation education among producers and operators of controlled chemicals and guided businesses to form self-discipline. Clues on suspected violations of controlled chemicals export were investigated timely to effectively prevent proliferation. China cooperated with other States Parties to timely verify and clarify import and export data on chemicals listed in schedules of the Convention.