The Demythologised CodeWhy Do We—the Jurists—Still Need the Code[1]
Paulina S＇wiᶒcicka[2]
A world ends when its metaphor has died.
An age becomes an age，all else beside，
When sensuous poets in their pride invent
Emblems for the soul's consent
That speak the meanings men will never know
But man-imagined images can show：
It perishes when those images，though seen，
No longer mean.[3]
【Abstract】The first aim of the paper is to examine the idea of creation of collections of legal rules and，then，the idea of codification of law as one of the fundamental components of the modern（Western）European legal culture—a kind of ‘metaphor we—the jurists—live by，’ despite the changes of post-modernism—a metaphor that reflects in particular thinking about the system of law，which requires or even demands certainty and stability of legal rules，autonomous and universal justice and systematic legal education. The second aim is to answer the question about the place of the code in the twenty-first century—the presumed ‘age of decodification.’ Finally，the third aim of the article is to examine such problems as：the legal culture of Europe—in general，and the one of contemporary Poland—in particular as able to go on without the code；the need of lawyers of having the code as well as their constant belief in the idea of codification as ‘constant in inconstancy’ or ‘timeless in temporality’ resembling the belief in the legal reality—as the best reality of possible ones—organised thanks to the established codification.
1.Introduction：The End of the Code？
The increasing use by contemporary Polish lawyers，representatives of both legal dogmatic and legal history，of the term ‘decodification’ suggests that one can speak either of the end of the ‘era of the code’ or of the exhaustion of the ‘idea of codification.’[4] Briefly speaking，the idea of ‘decodification’—means，in general，the loss by the code of its central place in the hierarchy of sources of law（especially civil law）due to the adoption of particular legal acts，statutes containing general principles as well as the expansion of normative sources being non-classical for the legal culture of civil law countries，such as，for example，judicial decisions or even private agreements.
Therefore，one may ask whether it is still possible to recognise and identify this phenomenon，which is codification，and its product—the code，and to indicate the crucial moment of such change of paradigms，since，as a rule，there is no particular way to prove scientifically that mankind is experiencing ‘the end of something，’ eg. ‘the era of codification.’ Every ‘end of any era’ might or might not be prevised or pre-felt. As Harold J. Berman put it：‘That the Western legal tradition，like Western civilization as a whole，is undergoing in the 20th century a crisis greater than it has ever known before is not something that can be proved scientifically. It is something that is known，ultimately，by intuition.’[5]
Therefore，the fact that the old images have lost their meaning is said only intuitively. However，since at least the sixties of the 20th century and publication of the famous book by Natalino Irti，L'età della decodificazione[6]it has been claimed in legal science that ‘we live in the end of the era of codification’[7]and even ‘a death of the code’ has been declared.[8]
Such statements，as mentioned，also appear in Polish literature on law，[9] somehow as a kind of aspiration to participate in the European discussion on changes brought by recent decades.
It is true that the 20th century brought many changes in the understanding of legal order，and，finally，law started to be judged via its pragmatic effectiveness.[10] In the 21st century these changes were even deepened，which resulted in the need for inclusion of such phenomena as Europeanisation and globalisation of law or interference of legal systems in the research on the legal history and legal dogmatic.[11] Yet，another problem connected with such changes concerns the question：How much space is left in this new reality for the fervent faith and loyalty to tradition understood as a sort of a collective memory of past experiences？
Changes，however，are not always to be feared. It is possible that these changes are for the better. Undoubtedly，they are inevitable and they are a matter of facts，so they are beyond the will or actions of legal historians or dogmatists.[12] Anyway—in the prevailing opinion—they mark the end of an era—‘the era of codification.’[13] And because the course of history cannot be turned around，another question appears：What is the path that leads to the future？ Can one extract any useful resources from the collective memory of past experiences in order to overcome new challenges，new obstacles？ According to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin，it is the past which often reveals the way the future is built，[14] therefore，the reasonable reflection on the stability and transformation in law or the analysis of phenomena of continuity and progress，appearing for centuries in a nearly sinusoidal frequency，show that certain values and ideas are immutable，[15] though not without significance is the respect for their bounds with a particular era in which they appeared. Yet，some of such ideas were persistent，and it turned out that such persistence means their ‘life’ in themselves.[16]
2.The Idea of the Code
For centuries lawyers’ thinking about ‘the code’ was marked by certain ideas and stereotypes. And still it is. The code is a symbol of a stable legal order，a metaphor of a statute law，or a metaphor of the orderly created and certain legal order. The code aims to ensure the completeness and consistency of legal solutions. One may indicate（here：only exemplarily）the statements given by lawyers according to which the code is ‘the final point of the legal experience’ or ‘the highest legislative achievement’.
‘Codification acts are the most formal and highest expression of the reign of the statute law. The useful value of such an act depends primarily on its content，on its ability to adapt to economic and social conditions existing in the country where the codified law is to take effect. Also，the level of legislative techniques should not be underestimated […].’[17]
In this way，the legal discourse，through the metaphor of ‘the code’，on the one hand urges a particular vision of the world，[18] and on the other hand it enters the realm of a myth，[19] although the myth does not necessarily mean the historical untruth. The myth relates only to a particular way of perceiving—understanding and creating the reality，it does not have anything to do with the true reality.[20] However，one must always ask the question concerning the following problem：how，in the narrative about law，both binding in the past and in the present times，is it possible to distinguish between ‘the real’ and ‘the imaginary.’[21]
It is true that the European civilisation assimilated the code. But again，one may ask：how is it possible that ‘a stock’ or ‘a block’（the word ‘code’ comes from the Latin word caudex，and when a popular pronunciation was adopted widely：codex，which meant precisely ‘a stock’ or ‘a wooden block’[22]—has anything to do with a set of legal provisions？Well，it is also a metaphor—‘standard block’，symbolising the statute law order，as a phenomenon of systematic and closed，complete and consistent legal order，which was a sort of medium of historical creation of a（European，but not only，as we may see in such countries as China，Turkey，or countries of the South America）legal culture of the last two centuries. Lawyers want the code because they believe in it and they reason within a particular civilisation，but also within a particular legal order.[23]
Humanity has always needed to preserve the outputs of its creative genius，e.g. laws. In Antiquity the post-classical codices（in part. Gregorianus vel Hermogenianus： CTh 4.1.3 Interpretatio[24]）and the Justinian's Codex domini nostri Iustiniani sacratissimi principis repetitae praelectionis（534 A.D.）were the final answers to those needs-as the codex was a set-a collection of legal rules.[25] However，just then the parchment codex became the symbol of the new order，as described by Franz Wieacker：‘The code is not only a deliberative form，but also，as many cultural realities，it is an expression of a certain attitude towards the word as a mean of communication. The scroll is assigned to the spoken word culture and therefore in the times of late Antiquity it was a symbol of an independent Hellenistic education. A heavy，definable，able to be browsed，but also able to be ornamented volume—the code—is a symbol of the culture of the written word and the authoritative understanding of the text.’[26]
‘The code’ as ‘a collection of legal rules’ also today retains its nominal formula ‘a wooden stock，’ ‘a normative block.’ As a stock or a block it does take a form of a coherent，consistent，complete and closed corpus. Metaphorically，one can say that—in legal thinking，but also in the general understanding，typical especially for civilizations where the rights are placed in the normative centre—it is a durable，unchangeable and complete，coherent and consistent body of legal provisions，which gives a sense of security and guarantees the stability of a legal order，in Antiquity named as a ius certum（Cic. de inv. 2.22.67；Quint. inst. 12.3.6-7；comp. Neratius 5 memb. D. 22.6.2：cum ius finitum et possit esse et debeat）.[27] The ancient often pointed out that as few possible rules which have established understanding should be changed（Paul. 4 ad Plaut. D. 1.3.23：Minime sunt mutanda，quae interpretationem certam semper habuerunt.），adding that the benefit obtained with the introduction of new legal solutions and removal of the old ones had to be obvious（Ulp. 4 fid. D. 1.4.2：In rebus novis constituendis evidens esse utilitas debet，ut recedatur ab eo iure，quod diu aequum visum est.）.[28]Regardless of the reflection of the ancient jurists a similar thought was adopted as a guiding principle by the Polish Codification Commission for Civil Law，which worked from 1996 till 2015 by the Minister of Justice，[29] in the so-called Green Book.[30] It is where，among other programme's declarations，one may find a statement：‘Therefore，the accepted and tested legal institutions and terms should not be changed too hastily.’[31] The certain and stable law is also one of the demands indispensable to consider the legal order as ‘intrinsically moral’，postulated by the American philosopher Lon L. Fuller.[32] Similarly，one of the Polish legal philosophers，Jerzy Stelmach，emphasising that law must take into account the tradition，already adopted habits，accepted principles，or widely accepted standards，asked provocatively：‘Why change something that has been and worked in legal reality for a long time？’，declaring in addition that ‘without substantial reason one should not undermine the authority of the confirmed tradition of institutions.’[33]
Therefore，the modern metaphor of the code as ‘a wooden stock’ or a ‘normative block’ means consistency，rational order，completeness，cohesion and coherence of the ‘centre’ of a particular branch of law—and this is a great longing brought by the times of the Enlightenment，as a moment of ‘disenchantment with the law’[34] and rationalisation of the European legal culture. It is true，however，that every day this metaphor is the so-called used metaphor as verified by the reality as well as that the cult of science and the controllable legal interpretation based on certain model do not make the humanity rational.
3.Compilations and Codifications
Legal history is familiar with many examples of collections and compilations of legal rules of varying thematic scope，and the historical narrative and even dogmatic narrative concerning law often mention，sometimes without a proper historical understanding，various ‘codes’ and ‘codifications.’[35] As we know，already in the period of Antiquity and Middle Ages，or later，such collections of usages—legal habits，or statute rules，and even larger legislative acts，including provisions for all sorts of legal relations，were very common and they always had major importance as further steps of a common legal experience. They were not，however，codifications，and certainly they were not codifications in the modern understanding of this term，which—as we know—was proposed and described by Jeremy Bentham at the end of the 18th century.[36] Before，even if the notion of ‘code’ appeared—as mentioned—as the name of such legal acts，such compilation meant the codification projects，collection of rules（also private collections），collections of judgements and commentary works. It is a fact that in the historical narrative the authors wrote about ‘codes’ and ‘codifications’ while examining the legal history through dozens of centuries，[37] perhaps because of terminological poverty，and perhaps because of the lawyers’ faith in the myth of the coherence and certainty of the legal order. In the historical narrative，the ‘code’ is regarded as foundation of such coherence and certainty，as a perfect，complete and consistent collection of legal rules，which in the same time presupposes a certain and—more important—controllable model of their application（Benthamian complete body of law of all-comprehensiveness[38]）.[39] However，such an attitude or even faith leads at the same time to forgetting about the socio-economic，political and intellectual changes and about extremely slow development of a legislative technique. Again，this is a sort of manipulation of the historical narrative，because one can speak about ‘codification’ only in cases where legal solutions come as a result of conscious and deliberate speculative and abstract evaluations of abstractly imagined situations that might happen in the future，[40] which，to paraphrase the words of an eminent Polish scholar，Henryk Kupiszewski，can be included in the formula：‘the codification is a mean，by which on the basis of the experience of yesterday the needs of today and tomorrow shall be governed.’[41] Otherwise it can be only a collection，compilation，consolidation or incorporation of existing legal material.
Such an abstract approach to the statute law and legislative acts only in the 19th and 20th centuries began to dominate as a sort of almost psychological guidance，supported by a kind of rational institutionalisation of beliefs and expectations that law should be certain，transparent and complete. One can even consider that a certain dogma appeared—the dogma about the need for codification and the code has become a metaphor of the legal order and the legal profession as determined in its interpretation by a certain ‘literary’ model.
Therefore，in the continental legal culture there was always a tendency to create comprehensive regulations as sorts of ideal collection of rules，as normative cores—specific ‘blocks’ of particular branches of law，but also it should be noted that this trend seems to be rather the result of the lawyers’ faith（a sort of ‘legal religion’）in legal science as able，via conceptual and abstract categories，to create human relationships，by binding the rights and obligations of individuals with specific situations.
4.The Idea of Completeness of Codification？
No matter how far the development of law in the 20th century can be joined with a broadly understood codification programme，Stefan Grzybowski was right while saying that it would be a profound mistake to see in codification the main，or perhaps even decisive，source of every legal problem.[42]For this reason codification has to be put in the category of myth，and the code has to be regarded as the aforementioned ‘stock’ or ‘block’—the metaphor of a statute law，built on the ideal of legal enactment as dominant，uniform and exclusive act being a complete and coherent source of law，whose existence aims to guarantee-both to lawyers and to the society—the stability of the legal order and the existence of solutions for every possible case，which can be obtained through a particular model of legal reasoning understood as a simple subsumptio.
It is also worth emphasising that although the process of codification（the creation of the code project，its establishment and implementation）was until recently considered the main achievement of legislation，in most cases codes required additional，sometimes several，specific acts，and therefore did not meet the requirement to be a complete regulation of a given branch of law.
‘The process of codification，namely the creation of the project of the code，and then its establishment and implementation，takes，in general，many years and until recently was regarded as a culmination of legislative achievement. Currently，this opinion has changed.’[43] ‘[…lawyers] for decades of the 20th century believed that codification，as understood in its nineteenth-century sense/meaning，is the most excellent mean to build the order of private law. The practice of the eighties of the past century has undermined this faith.’[44]
Codifications，precisely because of the general character of legal assessments，have always remained in obvious contradiction with the current needs of life. One may，however，ask if this aspect really means weakness of a code？
Such an awareness of the coexistence of the advantages and disadvantages of codification was expressed already in the first half of the 20th century by the Polish lawyer，Fryderyk Zoll（Jr.），who wrote：‘[…] legal rules，even those most carefully developed by the legislative bodies，can never cover the rich content of law，necessary for the colourful and manifold human life，and，in particular，the content of this major ideal，the so-called just law. Therefore，a lawyer applying law to the cases of everyday life must adjust these provisions，supplement them，fill the loopholes by analogy，sometimes even improve，if they do not accurately express the will of the legislator—with this creative work a lawyer must be guided by the great art of the just and perfect law.’[45]
In a similar vein one of the eminent Polish civil law professor of the 20th century，Alfred Ohanowicz wrote：‘The codification does not encompass the whole of civil law. It is a habit which is adopted everywhere where civil law is included into one code. Nonetheless，a certain set of acts，being exclusively or mainly of civilian character，for practical，historical or opportunistic reasons always remains outside the code. The main framework of the material is provided by the legal science and legislative practice. Therefore，only the margin remains，where certain legal institutions are either regulated outside the code or standardised in the code. It is a matter of origin and convention rather than the essence and nature of the legal provisions.’[46]
The other thing is that rules and principles adopted by a codification are often adversely affected by specific legislative acts passed without proper thought and control over the kind of ‘legislative populism’ dominating in contemporary ‘technological reality’ of law creation，or they are abused by the legal practice，even if the code as a central normative act in particular field of law is inscribed in the minds of lawyers，who still regard the relationship between the past and present in a standard way，classifying them as pre-and post-codification.
So again，one may metaphorically say that today legal history is not concentrated so much on the boundary between what is normatively old and modern，but on the line that separates once established codes from the reality of social life—and such a gap can be overcome not only by non-imperative and non-literal legal interpretation in the course of the legal practice，but also by indispensable reflection on tradition. ‘The law is not merely ongoing. It has a history. It tells a story.’[47]—wrote Harold J. Berman. And there is a close relationship between the oblivion of tradition and something that Polish philosopher Leszek Koɫakowski described as ‘symptoms of the disease of civilisation’.[48]
5.The Place for the Code in Modern Reality
Modern codifications were an important achievement in the course of legal history and they still perform their tasks，but，as mentioned，their value is now，in the 21st century，even more strongly depreciated than in the second half of the 20th century. That is the reason for many doubts about the value of codification. However，neither this method nor the concept of regrouping of normative material have been abandoned，as a model of constitution as a stable basis for organisation of the constitutional State which cannot be changed in any moment.
Yet，as mentioned at the beginning of this study，a world ends when its metaphor has died—wrote Archibald MacLeish.[49] So one should ask the question suggested at the beginning：what is ‘a codification’ in the ‘era of decodification，’ which means that ‘ancient images’ have lost their importance，and the current methodology is gradually moving away from a positivistic division between the past and the present，and which in its place puts legal traditions as ‘not-binding but requiring’[50] ，and tradition is nothing else but the extension of the past to the present and even the future.[51]
It seems that nowadays the place of the code in the ‘era of decodification’ depends primarily on the understanding of the notion that today law is autonomous and undetermined. There are no longer any specific objectives for codification，such as strengthening of national sovereignty，the effective or equitable redistribution and allocation of goods，and even allocation of the political power.
What is more，today law is no longer a product of rational decision of the legislative body，and the legislator does not need to be ‘reasonable，’ although this is required by the principle of legal security and a general rule of adjudication；[52] and even in general，the legislator does not have to act at all，because there are other，non-imperative ways to create normative solutions regarded afterwards as binding，such as usus，a contract，a solution proposed in the framework of the interpretive legal practice（the so-called soft law），[53] or even a solution adopted by extra-state bodies so that the legal order may be called ‘multicentric.’[54]
As Paul W. Kahn wrote：‘Law is not constructed according to a systematic plan and it exhibits no single rational order. That reason operates within the legal order-as it surely does-should not be taken to mean that the set of meanings expressed in law's rule is itself a product of systematic rationality.’[55] Zygmunt Bauman emphasised that today's law is a sort of stateless law as a consequence of reducing the role of the state in the modern world in conjunction with a globalisation of law.[56] Patrick Glenn mentioned a decline in normative authority of formal sources of law，and in the same time stressed the reinforcing role of tradition for the normativity.[57]
A codification，therefore，could be clarified or justified today not by reference to its self-sufficiency，and also not by reference to its necessity as an outcome of political or economic influence or pressure，or as a result of the jurisprudential genius. Also for this reason the code should not be seen as an imperfect attempt to achieve internal references，or should not be seen as a partially achieved effect of codification activities. On the other hand，today the code could be the metaphor of a coherent social order or maybe even—as Clifford Geertz pointed out—a ‘vision of society，’[58] achieved at some stage of its development，still present，despite recent changes in law—in the mind of the society，including，in particular，practicing lawyers.
Therefore，the analysis of a place of codification in contemporary legal reality should not begin with methodological individualism，but with the community as a phenomenon，which appeared once as a distinct historical entity.[59] The key to the understanding of the place of codification as a cultural form of organising a normative reality and as a basis for the common trust in law is placed in the political and historical ideas of the community，and，in particular，in ideas of one social group—the lawyers.
To end：one may recall the question asked by Friedrich Carl von Savigny[60] at the beginning of the ‘era of codification，’ but in slightly different form：Has the pluralistic society of the 21st century matured to ‘decodification，’ because have we a better mean to replace a code？ This psychological need of a community and lawyers—which is still the basis，even if an imperfect one（because it is the basis far from faith in the self-sufficiency of the text），for the legal order and for a model of application of law？ Maybe codification as a model and an idea survives the subsequent cultural crises？
Fear of ‘the end of a particular civilisation’ is，in principle，a sign of the faith in its coming and thus it contributes to its fulfilment. Meanwhile，proclamation of the annihilation of civilisation—here：a civilisation of the code—seems to be unacceptable. When，in fact，one forgets about one of the most important ideas of legal order，recognised and understood since ancient times—i.e. the idea of law established and certain，the culture of the Western Europe will lose its historical and moral sense. That is why lawyers believed and still believe in the code more than in temporary regulations of specific legal issues，which are of secondary and relative importance，and this belief of a therapeutic character is of the utmost importance in the postmodern legal reality，because this belief demythologises the consciousness. The faith is always a foundation of hope for the survival of civilisation，which rightly believes to be founded on the principles—the ancient pillars，and which is aware that an alternative could be the slipping down in the Hobbes’ state of nature. The code provides some degree of stability of the system—and this is now its main role. Therefore，today no one openly disputes the need for a code. For most lawyers it would be at least frivolous or ridiculous. What is more，this form is still preferred as the organising one，both at national and supra-national level，[61] no matter how strong are voices stating that ‘the code is already or will be tomorrow found to be incapable to…’ The civilisation of the code—at the level of modern society and modern humanity—is still，with all its advantages and disadvantages，inseparably associated with a code，despite opinions of some scholars who declared：‘Even a diagnosis was made that the process of decodification is a reaction to the weakness of codification.’[62] This type of statements—even if only relata refero—may summon up the motto of the post-positivistic methodological anarchism，i.e. ‘anything goes，’[63] i.e. decodification may be used to name and to explain any actual weakness of a legal system.
The faith in the code，but also in the role of lawyers who participate in the myth，is impossible to be imposed by force—as imposed it would no longer be the faith. It cannot also be proven scientifically—it would not be the faith ex definitione. When it exists—as a psychological element of a community，and，in particular of lawyers—that faith，even if in the form of semi-conscious，organises and supports the belief that the code is essentially a form of organisation of a social life，a guarantee of legal certainty and predictability，which means a possibility of finding a proper solution of every legal problem. If one assumes that this faith could vanish，it would be sufficient to preach about the demise of the European civilisation. Neither philosophy of law，nor sociology，nor any of legal dogmatic are able to take over the tasks of the faith. Usually，lost myths are replaced by caricatures of myths，but not by the rationality of the Enlightenment. The decodification—as an element of the postmodern narrative about law—is therefore nothing else than a caricature of the current mythologised collective thinking about law，and as a caricature of the myth it may be only ‘a fashionable topic’ to debate，but it can also cause the need and desire to revive the old myth.
除去神话色彩的法典：为什么我们法学家仍然需要法典？
宝琳娜·斯维切卡
【摘要】本文第一个目的是考察法律规则汇编和作为现代西欧法律文化一个基本组成部分的法典的编制。尽管发生了各种后现代变化，法典仍然是“我们法学家赖以生存的一个象征”。这一象征尤其反映了有关法律系统的思想。它需要甚至要求法律规则的确定性和稳定性、自主和普遍的正义以及系统的法律教育。本文的第二个目的是回答有关法典在被认为是“去法典化的时代”的21世纪中的地位的问题。本文的第三个目的是探讨以下问题：欧洲法律文化，特别是当代波兰法律文化在没有法典的情况下的继续发展，以及律师对法典的需要以及他们有关法典化理念的坚定不移的信念。对他们而言，法典化是“变幻无常中的常数” 和“短暂中的永恒”。他们有关法典化的信念类似于他们有关法律现实的信念——对他们而言，这种因法典化而变得井然有序的现实是各种可能发生的现实中最好的一个。
[1]The study is based several contributions of mine：‘Szes＇z＇ hipotez na temat ogólnos＇wiatowej historii kodyfikacji’[‘Six Hypothesis on the Global History of Codification’]，given during the National Conference：‘S＇mierc＇ kodeksu？ Dekodyfikacje’ [‘Death of the Code？ Decodifications’]，held at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow on 17th-18th January 2014；and after，in English，during the International Conference：‘25 Years After the Transformation. Law and Legal Culture in Central and Eastern Europe between Continuity and Discontinuity’，organised by The Faculty of Law of the Masaryk University in Brno，held on 16th-17th April 2015；the 7th Conference on Legal History in Szeged：‘Codification Achievements and Failures in the 19th-20th Century’ organised by the Department of Legal History of the University of Szeged，Faculty of Law and Political Sciences，in cooperation with the Board of Legal Sciences of the Regional Committee in Szeged of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences，Szeged，Hungary；the 3th Sino-Polish Semminar on Comparative Law held on 7th November 2017 in Beijing. The full version of the study，in Polish，appeared in the collection of studies published within a grant project no. 2014/13/B/HS5/00857：Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier（ed），Dekodyfikacja prawa prywatnego. Szkice do portretu [Decodification of Private Law：A Sketch to its Portrait]（Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2017）38-84. The title of the study and this assertion is inspired by the title and the content of the book by Georg Lakoff，Mark Johnson，Metaphors We Live By （University of Chicago Press 2003）.
[2]Assistant Professor in the Department of Roman Law at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
[3]Archibald MacLeish，‘The Metaphor’ from ‘Hypocrite Auteur’ in Collected Poems：1917-1982（Houghton Mifflin 1985）.
[4]One may also observe that in the light of the postmodern tendencies of exhaustiveness of the ‘traditional’ phenomena and structures，which provoke their crisis or even deaths in the scientific discourse，the authors continue to dazzle the audience often confused，the hypothesis about ‘the end of the era of codification，’ or ‘the death of the code’ is not a particular statement. However，one can ask whether such an opinion does not go too far？ Especially because of the fact that it is fashionable ‘the end of time，’ ‘the crisis of European science’ etc. See，just for example：Francis Fukuyama， Koniec historii [The End of History]（Tomasz Bieroń and Marek Wichrowski tr，Znak 1999）；id，Ostatni czɫowiek [The Last Man]（Tomasz Bieroń tr，Znak 1999）；Donald Kuspit，Koniec sztuki [The End of Art]（Janusz Borowski tr，Muzeum Narodowe w Gdańsku 2006）；Damian Thompson，Koniec czasu—wiara i lęk w cieniu millenium [The End of Time—Faith and Fear in the Millenium]（Bogumiɫa Nawrot tr，Prószyński i S-ka 1999）；Edmund Husserl，Kryzys nauk europejskich i fenomenologia transcedentalna [The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology]（Sɫawomira Walczewska tr，Wydawnictwo Rolewski 1999）. I mentioned this particular problem in Paulina S＇więcicka，‘Libertas scribendi—libertas philosophandi. Some Remarks on the Method of Research in the Field of Legal History（in Relation to the Book by Jerzy Kolarzowski，Idea praw jednostki w pismach Braci Polskich. U narodzin nowoytnej koncepcji praw czɫowieka=The Idea of Individual Rights in the Writings of the Polish Brethren. Born of the Concept of Human Rights，Warsaw University Press，Warsaw 2009，pp. 241）’（2012）5 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 1，67-84.
[5]Harold J Berman，Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition （Harvard University Press 1983）33；cf Leszek Koɫakowski，Jezus os＇mieszony. Esej apologetyczny i sceptyczny（Dorota Zańko tr，Znak 2014）18-20.
[6]Natalino Irti， L'età della decodificazione（1st edn，Giuffrè 1979；4th edn，Giuffrè 1999）.
[7]Manlio Bellomo，L'Europa del diritto commune（7th edn，Il Cigno GG Edizioni 1994）41-42：‘L'età della codificazione è storicamente finita’，which provokes ‘un rudere dell’età moderna’. In the same way：Filippo Gallo，‘La codificazione giustinianea’（1986）14 Index 45-46 and fn 21.
[8]Philippe Rémy，‘The French Code Civil：a Model（Not）to Follow？’ in Gavin Barrett，Ludovic Bernardeau（eds），Towards a European Civil Code. Reflections on the Codification of Civil Law in Europe （ERA-Forum 2002）20.
[9]One may find similar remarks in Polish legal scholarship. Cf for the whole Polish literature on this topic see my conclusive study mentioned in the first note. For some interesting remarks see in particular：Tomasz Giaro，‘Prawo i historia w dobie globalizacji. Nowe rozdanie kart’ [‘Law and History in the Era of Globalisation. A New Approach’] in Tomasz Giaro（ed），Prawo w dobie globalizacji. Konferencja Wydziaɫu Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego（5 marca 2010）[Law in the Era of Globalisation. A Conference Organised by the Department of Law and Administration of the University of Warsaw，5 March 2010]（Liber 2011）73-88；Wojciech Dajczak，‘Poszukiwanie nowego ？adu prawa prywatnego w okresie jego dekodyfikacji i instrumentalizacji. Uwagi z perspektywy tradycji romanistycznej’ [‘The Search for A New Order of Private Law During Its Decodification and Instrumentalisation. Remarks from the Perspective of the Romanist Tradition’] in Joanna Radwanowicz-Wanczewska，Piotr Niczyporuk and Karol Kuz＇micz（eds），Jednostka a państwo na przestrzeni wieków [A Person and A State thorough the Ages]（Temida 2 2008）83-95；repeated in Wojciech Dajczak and Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier，‘Prawo rzymskie w czasach dekodyfikacji’ [‘Roman Law in the Times of Decodification’] 10（2012） Forum Prawnicze 8-22；Wojciech Dajczak in Wojciech Dajczak，Tomasz Giaro and Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier，Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa prywatnego [Roman Law. The Fundaments of Private Law]（2nd edn，Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2014）571. For an unnecessary use of the term ‘decodification’ in the legal and dogmatic narratives Paulina S＇więcicka，‘Sinusoid of Legal History. Learning from Roman Law a fascinating challenge for our（post）modernity’ in ‘Turning Points and Break Lines’. Jahrbuch Junge Rechtsgeschichte （Meidenbauer 2009）vol 4，454-488.
[10]cf Tomasz Giaro，‘Od Redaktora’ [‘From the Editor’] in Tomasz Giaro（ed）， Skutecznos＇z＇ prawa [The Effectiveness of Law]（Liber 2010）7；Hubert Izdebski，‘Referat końcowy：Refleksje o skutecznos＇ci prawa’ [‘The Ending Words：Some Remarks on the Effectiveness of Law’] in Skutecznos＇z＇ prawa（n 9）249-274；Jerzy Stelmach，‘Efektywne prawo’[‘The Efective Law’] in ‘Vetera novis augere’.Studia i prace dedykowane Profesorowi Wacɫawowi Uruszczakowi [‘Vetera novis augere’. Studies Dedicated to Professor Wacɫaw Uruszczak] （Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2010）vol. 2，957-958.
[11]cf Giaro（n 8）73，who emphasise that the legal science is a part of the modern world，and，therefore，it should answer the modern questions. See also，in the same way Stelmach（n 9）957，958，965-966；cf also an analysis of the changes in law wrought by the times of post-positivism and post-modernity in Reinhard Zimmermann，Roman Law，Contemporary Law，European Law. The Civilian Tradition Today（OUP 2001）107，187-189；Lech Morawski，Gɫówne problem wspóɫczesnej filozofii prawa. Prawo w toku przemian [The Main Problems of the Modern Legal Science. Law in the Times of Change]（4th edn，Wydawnictwo Prawnicze PWN 2005）.
[12]Giaro（n 8）73.
[13]cf Maria Luisa Murillo，‘The Evolution of Codification in the Civil Law Legal Systems：Towards Decodification and Recodification’（2001）11 Journal of Transnational Law ＆ Policy 1-20；Andrea La Mattina，‘Il codice civile europeo dell’età della decodificazione’（2001）2 Economia e diritto del terziario 1-12；cf also M. McAuley，‘Proposal for a Theory and a Method of Recodification’（2003）49 Loyola Law Review 2，261-286.
[14]Pierre Teilhard de Chardin，Pisma [Studies] （Mieczysɫaw Tazbir tr，Instytut Wydawniczy PAX 1987）vol 3，73；in the same way Zimmermann（n 10）187.
[15]Katarzyna Sójka-Zielińska，Drogi i bezdroa prawa. Szkice z dziejów kultury prawnej Europy [The Ways of Law. Studies on the European Legal Culture]（Ossolineum 2000）8-9.
[16]Henryk Olszewski，‘Czas i trwanie w historii idei’ [‘The Lasting of Ideals’] in Krystyna Chojnicka，Anna Citkowska-Kimla and Wiesɫaw Kozub-Ciembroniewicz（eds）， Czas a trwanie idei politycznych i prawnych [The Time and Lasting of Political and Legal Ideals]（Wolters Kluwer 2008）18-19.
[17]Stefan Grzybowski，Dzieje prawa. Opowies＇z＇，refleksje，rozwaania [History of Law. A Story，Observation，Remarks]（Ossolineum 1981）166.
[18]On the persuasiveness of the metaphorical，anthropomorphical and metonymical narratives as tools of building of ‘the truth’，cf Friedrich Nietzsche，Werke in drei Bänden（11 edn，Carl Hanser 1982）vol 3，314ff. On the role of a metaphor in the historical narrative see：Phillip Stambovsky，‘Metaphor and Historical Understanding’（1988）27 History and Theory 2，125-34；id，The Deceptive Image. Metaphor and Literary Experience（University of Massachusetts Press 1988）；Alexander Demand，Metaphern für Geschichte. Sprachbilder und Gleichnisse im historischen Denken（CH Beck 1976）；Maurice H Mandelbaum，The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge（The Johns Hopkins University Press 1977）ch 2；Hayden White，Metahistory：The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe（Johns Hopkins University Press 1973）；Frank R Ankersmit，History and Tropology. The Rise and Fall of Metaphor（University of California Press 1994）；Jerzy Topolski，‘Funkcjonowanie metafor w narracji historycznej’ [‘Metaphors in the Historical Narrative’]in id， Jak się pisze i rozumie historię. Tajemnice narracji historycznej [How to Write and Understand History. Secrets of the Historical Narrative]（2nd edn，Wydawnictwo Poznańskie 1998）185-202.
[19]On the links between the category of a metaphor and a category of a myth see in part. Nietzsche（n 17）314ff.
[20]cf Leszek Koɫakowski，Obecnos＇z＇ mitu [The Presence of a Myth]（Instytut Literacki 1972）7ff；Geoffrey S Kirk，Myth. Its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures （2nd edn Cambridge University Press 1973）1ff；cf on the myths in legal thinking Jerzy Stelmach，‘Mity prawnicze’ [‘Legal Myths’]wiat，Europa，Maɫa Ojczyzna.Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Stanisɫawowi Grodziskiemu w 80-lecie urodzin [World—Europe—Little Homeland. in S＇ Studies dedicated to Professor Stanisɫaw Grodziski]（Bielsko Biaɫa：Wysza Szkoɫa Administracji 2009）1145-55；on myths in the historical narrative cf Paulina S＇więcicka，‘Some Aspects of the Myth of Communis Opinio Doctorum as Ius Commune Universale’ in Janwillem Oostehuis and Emanuel G D van Dongen（eds），European Traditions：Integration or Disintegration（Wolf Legal Publishers 2012）63-84；ead，‘Przewroty Kopernikańskie w dziejach europejskiej kultury prawnej—refleksja romanistyczna’ [‘Copernican Revolutions in the History of the European Legal Culture—A Reflection of a Romanist’] in ‘Regnare Gubernare Administrare.’ Prawo i wɫadza na przestrzeni wieków. Prace dedykowane profesorowi Jerzemu Malcowi z okazji 40-lecia pracy naukowej [‘Regnare Gubernare Administrare.’ Law and Power over the Centuries. Studies Dedicated to Professor Malec on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of His Scientific Work]（Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2012）vol 2，207-19，with further literature in fn 6-21；cf Paolo Grossi，Mitologie giuridiche della modernità（3rd edn，Jovene 2007）43-6 on the impossibility of combination of notions of ‘myth’ and ‘modernity.’
[21]Cf S＇więcicka ‘ rnikańskie’（n 19）209-11；ead，‘Some Aspects’（n 19）67-8，83-4.
[22]Ovid. met. 12.432；Plin. NH 11.151；Gell. 16.16.3；Varr. non. 535.11；Sen. dial. 10.13.4；Suet. frag. 134；cf Wɫadysɫaw Kopaliński，Sɫownik mitów i tradycji kultury [A Dictionary of Myths and Cultural Traditions]（PWN 1985）496 s.v. kodeks [a code] as：a stock，a block，a tablet，a wooden tablet and also a book，a collection of legal provisions； ， Sɫownik ɫacińsko-polski dla prawników i historyków [A Latin-Polish Dictionary for Lawyers and Historians] （Universitas 1997）162 s.v. codex 8；Alfred Ernout and Antoine Meillet，Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine. Histoire des mots （Edité par Libraire 1959）130 s.v. codex（caudex）；A Latin Dictionary：Founded on Andrews’ Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary：Revised，Enlarged，and in Great Part Rewritten by Charlton T. Lewis，Ph.D. and Charles Short（OUP 1958）303 s.v. caudex 1（codex）； P G W Glare（ed）， Oxford Latin Dictionary （Oxford Clarendon Press 2008）287 s.v. caudex，with source references；Marian Plezia（ed），Sɫownik ɫacińsko-polski [A Latin-Polish Dictionary]（Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2007）vol. 1，548 s.v. codex；H. Heumanns Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts in neunter Auflage，neu bearbeitet von Dr. E. Seckel（9th edn， Verlag von Gustav Fischer 1914）73 s.v. codex.
[23]Wojciech Cyrul and Bartosz Broek，‘Globalny system prawa’ [‘The Global Legal System’] in Jerzy Stelmach（ed），Studia z filozofii prawa [Studies on Legal Philosophy]（Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2003）vol 2，93-109.
[24]cf Jean Gaudemet，‘La codification. Ses formes et ses fins’ in Estudios en homenaje al Prof. Juan Iglesias（Universidad Complutense 1988）209-327=id，Sociologie historique du droit（2000）128-9.
[25]Adolf Berger， Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law（American Philosophical Society 1953）391 s.v. codex； Sondel（n 21）162 s.v. codex 5；Wiesɫaw Litewski，Sɫownik encyklopedyczny prawa rzymskiego [Encyclopedic Dictionnary of Roman Law] （Universitas 1998）41 s.v. codex；cf Franz Wieacker，Textstufen klassischer Juristen（Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1960）93-119；Henryk Kupiszewski，‘Od kodeksu-ksiᶏki do kodeksu-zbioru przepisów prawnych’ in id，Prawo rzymskie a wspóɫczesnos＇z＇ [Roman Law and Modernity]（Wydawnictwo PWN 1988）198-214 [2nd edn，267-287]=‘Dal codice-libro al codice-raccolta di precetti giuridici’（1990）20 The Journal of Juristic Papyrology 83-92. On the reasons of creation of compilations of imperial constitutions in the times of Late Antiquity cf Dieter Nörr，‘Zu den geistigen und sozialen Grundlagen der spätantiken Kodifikationsbewegung’（1963）80 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte，Romanistische Abteilung 109-140.
[26]Wieacker（n 24）95.
[27]On the ides of ius certum in the Antiquity cf Ferdinando Bona，‘La certezza del diritto nella giurisprudenza tardo-repubblicana’ in Mario Sargenti and Guido Luraschi（eds），La certezza del diritto nell’esperienza giuridica romana. Atti del Convegno （Pavia，26-27 aprile 1985）（Cedam 1987）101-148；Lelio Lantella，‘Ius certum （in D. 1.2.2）’ in La certezza （n 26）223-231. On the modern problems cf Carla Faralli，‘Certezza del diritto o diritto alla certezza’（1997）1 Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 89-104；ead，‘Crisi del sistema tradizionale delle fonti e certezza’ in Francesco Modugno（ed），Esperienze giuridiche del’900 （Giuffrè 2000）69-84；ead，‘Il diritto alla certezza nell’eta della decodificazione’ in Scritti giuridici in onore di Sebastiano Cassarino（Cedam 2001）623-633.
[28]Ancient Greeks and Romans did not tend to change easily enacted laws：Henryk Kupiszewski，‘Prawo rzymskie ongis＇ i dzis＇’ [‘Roman Law in the Past and in the Present’] in id（n 26）11-40 [2nd edn，21-59]，in part. 23-26；Paulina S＇więcicka，‘z＇ródɫa prawa i ich obowiᶏzywanie’ [‘Sources of Law and their Binding Force-Contemporaneity and Antiquity’]（2011）4-5 Forum Prawnicze 65-84，in part. 72 and fn 43，44.
[29]From 1996 till December 2015 the works on changes of the Polish Civil code（enacted 23 April 1964）were provided by the Commission of Codification of Civil Law，created on the basis of the decree of Council of Ministers：Nr. 109/96，passed 17.09.1996：PL 1997，Nr. 1，p. 155-158. Cf. a Decree Nr. 109/96 of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1996 concerning the creation and organisation of the Commission of Codification of Civil Law in（1997）6 Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego 1，175-177；cf Decree of the Council of Ministers of 22 April 2002 on creation，organization and proceeding of the Commission of Codification of Civil Law：LJ 2002，Nr. 55，item 476. The works of the Commission terminated on the basis of a decision of a newly chosen Law and Justice Government.
[30]Zbigniew Radwański（ed），‘The Green Book’. The Optimal Vision of the Civil Code in the Republic of Poland （Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwos＇ci 2006）.
[31]Radwański（n 29）200.
[32]Lon L. Fuller，Moralnos＇z＇ prawa [The Morality of Law] （Stefan Amsterdamski tr，Wydawnictwo PWN 2004）32ff.
[33]Stelmach（n 9）957-966，964.
[34]After Artur Kozak，‘Trzy modele praktyki prawniczej’ [‘Three Models of Legal Practice’] in Stelmach（n 22）143.
[35]Cf e.g. Sójka-Zielińska（n 14）18 s.，25 s.，29 s.；3Marek Kuryɫowicz，Prawa antyczne. Wykɫady z historii najstarszych praw s＇wiata [Ancient Laws. Lectures on the Oldest World Laws]（Wydawnictwo UMCS 2006）25-29. Gaudemet（n 23）123-124 enumerated in details various collections named ‘codes’ or ‘codifications’cf an appeal of the necessity on ‘terminological clarification’ in the historical narrative on the collecting of legal provisions by Stanisɫaw Salmonowicz，‘Narodziny nowoytnej mys＇li kodyfikacyjnej w Europie’ [‘The Birth of the European Modern Thought on Codification’]（1977）29 Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne 1，80，82，87，91；id，‘Od Justyniana do Kodeksu Napoleona. Rozwaania nad problematykᶏ i terminologiᶏ zbiorów prawnych feudalnej Europy（rec.：J. Vanderlinden，Le concept de code en Europe occidentale du XIIIe au XIXe siècle：essai de définition，Bruxelles 1967）’ [‘From Justinian to the Code of Napoleon. Remarks on the problems and terminology of collections of legal provisions in the Feudal Europe（review of J. Vanderlinden，Le concept de code en Europe occidentale du XIIIe au XIXe siècle：essai de définition，Bruxelles 1967）]’（1969）21 Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne 1，183ff；cf Leonard Górnicki，Prawo cywilne w pracach Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1919-1939 [Civil Law in the Works of the Commission of Codification in the Republic of Poland in 1919-1939] （Kolonia Ltd. 2000）64 on the problems with conventionality of historical cesures in matter of terminology；id，‘Kodyfikacja prawa prywatnego’ [‘Codification of Private Law’] in Marek Safjan（ed）System Prawa Prywatnego [The System of Civil Law] vol 1 ‘Prawo cywilne-częs＇z＇ ogólna’ [‘Civil Law-the General Part’]（2nd edn，C.H. Beck 2012）77-155；id，‘Rozwój idei kodyfikacji prawa od XVIII wieku do wspóɫczesnos＇ci’ [‘The Development of the Idea of Codification of Law from the 18th century till the Present Times’] in ‘Vetera novis augere’ （n 9）vol 1，283.
[36]Jacques Vanderlinden，‘Code et codification dans la pensée de Jeremy Bentham’（1964）32 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 32（1964）44-46. The Works of Jeremy Bentham，Published under the Superintendence of his Executor，John Bowring，vol 3 ‘Usury，Political Economy，Equity，Parliamentary Reform’（William Tait 1843）155-210. See also the works by Bentham collected in Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris（eds），Legislator of the World. Writings on Codification，Law and Education（Clarendon Press 1998）.
[37]Jacques Vanderlinden，Le concept de code en Europe occidental du XIIIe au XIXe siècle：essai de definition（éditions de l'Institut de sociologie，Université libre de Bruxelles 1967）；Mario E Viora，Consolidazioni e codificazioni. Contributo alla storia della codificazione（3nd edn，Giappichelli 1967）；Gaudemet（n 23）121-140；Lucio de Giovanni and Aldo Mazzacane（eds），La codificazione del diritto dall’antico al moderno. Incontri di studio，Napoli，gennaio-novembre 1996（Editoriale Scientifica 1998）；Pietro Caroni，‘La storia della codificazione e quella del codice’（2001）29 Index 55-81.
[38]Vanderlinden（n 35）44ff；cf Giuseppe Falchi，‘Presentazione di J. Bentham，Sull’influenza dei tempi e dei luoghi in material di legislazione’（2003）33 Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica 1，13ff.
[39]On the objectives of the codification of the 19th century era，in particular the uniformity of the legal practice，cf Artur Kozak，Granice prawniczej wɫadzy dyskrecjonalnej [The Limits of Legal Discretion Power] （Kolonia Ltd. 2002）ch IV.1 ‘Gɫówne zaɫoenia nowoczesnego modelu praktyki prawniczej’ [‘Main Ideals of the Modern Model of the Legal Practice’]. Cf Mateusz J Golecki，Między pewnos＇ciᶏ a efektywnoęciᶏ. Marginalizm instytucjonalny wobec prawotwórczego stosowania prawa [Between Certainty and Effectiveness. The Institutional Margin and the Creative Application of Law] （Wolters Kluwer 2011）22-23.
[40]Cf Herbert P Goodrich，‘Restatement and Codification’ in Alison Reppy（ed），Centenary Essays Celebrating One Hundred Years of Legal Reform（New York University. School of Law 1949）241-250；Hessel E Yntema，‘The Jurisprudence of Codification’ in Centenary Essays（n 39）251-264；Félix Ermacora，‘Les problèmes de la codification à la lumière des expériences et situations actuelles’ in Rapports généraux au VIe Congrès international de droit compare（E. Bruylant 1964）223-234；Stefan Grzybowski，‘Les lumières et les ombres de la codification à l’avenir prochain’（1969）17 Archivum Iuridicum Cracoviense 81-103.
[41]Henryk Kupiszewski，‘Prawo rzymskie—z＇ródɫo inspiracji wiecznie ywe’[‘Roman Law—an Undying Source of Inspiration’] in id（n 24）215-237 [2nd edn，289-317] 216.
[42]Grzybowski（n 16）175；cf Marek Zirk-Sadowski，Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa [Introduction into Legal Philosophy] （Wolters Kluwer 2011）12.
[43]Zirk-Sadowski（41）12.
[44]Dajczak and Longchamps de Bérier（n 8）9.
[45]Irena Homola-Sk？pska（ed），Wspomnienia Fryderyka Zolla（1865-1948）[The Memoires of Fryderyk Zoll（1865-1948）] （Zakamycze 2000）309.
[46]Alfred Ohanowicz，‘Kodeks cywilny’ [‘The Civil Code’]（1964）26 Ruch Prawniczy，Ekonomiczny，Socjologiczny 4，71.
[47]Berman（n 4）9.
[48]Koɫakowski（n 4）30.
[49]It is worth mentioning that precisely this fragment of MacLeish’ poem is quoted by authors of various books and studies，cf Jerzy Kosiński，Pinball—Gra （Ewa Kulik-Bielińska tr，Albatros 1993）51；Berman（n 4）v；Bryant M Darrol and Hans R Huessy（eds），Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy：Studies in His Life and Thought （E. Mellen Press 1986）21；or William Hutton and Jonathan Eagle，Earth's Catastrophic Past and Future：A Scientific Analysis of Information Challenged by Edgar Cayce（Universal-Publishers 2004）316.
[50]cf Giaro（n 8）74. On the tradition and its role in the thinking on law，cf H Patrick Glenn，Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law（OUP 2000）1-29.
[51]Glenn（n 49）11.
[52]H.J.M.Boukema，Good Law. Towards a Rational Lawmaking Process （Peter Lang 1982）52ff.
[53]Tomasz Giaro，‘Dal soft law moderno al soft law antico’ in Alessandro Somma（ed），Soft law e hard law nelle società postmoderne（Giapichelli 2009）83-99；cf Anne Peters and Isabella Pagotto，‘Miękkie prawo jako nowa metoda zarzᶏdzania—perspektywa prawna’ [‘The Soft Law as a New Method of Governing—a Legal Perspective’] in Lena Kolarska-Bobińska（ed），Nowe metody zarzᶏdzania w państwach Unii Europejskiej [New Methods of Governing in the State-Members of the European Union]（Wolters Kluwer PL 2008）110ff.
[54]cf a definition proposed by Ewa ɫętowska，‘Multicentrycznos＇z＇ wspóɫczesnego systemu prawa i jej konsekwencje’ [‘The Multicentercity of the Modern Legal System and Its Consequences’]（2005）60 Państwo i Prawo 4，3-10，who explained that the multicenter legal system meant that on the territory of one state several legal acts passed by various authorities were binding.
[55]Paul W. Kahn，The Cultural Study of Law：Reconstructing Legal Scholarship（University of Chicago Press 1999）98.
[56]Zygmunt Bauman，Postmodern Ethics（Blackwell 1993）139.
[57]Glenn（n 49）xxi.
[58]Clifford Geertz，The Interpretation of Cultures：Selected Essays （Basic Books 1973）5.
[59]E.g. Richard A Posner，The Problems of Jurisprudence（Harvard University Press 1990）414.
[60]Friedrich Carl von Savigny，Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft （Bey Mohr ＆ Zimmer 1814）.
[61]cf Fritz Sturm，‘Un codice dei contratti per l'Unione Europea. L'iniziativa dell’Academia dei giusprivatisti europei’ in Studi in memoria di G. Impallomeni （Giuffrè 1999）389-403；Federico Fernández de Buján，‘Ritorno a Roma en la elaboración del futuro Código europeo de contrator’（2000）66 Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris 245-261；Zimmermann（n 10）1，109ff；id，‘Codification：History and Present Significance of an Idea’（1995）3 European Review of Private Law 95-120.
[62]Dajczak and Longchamps de Bérier（n 8）9.
[63]Paul K.Feyerabend，Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge（Humanities Press 1978）23 s.；id，Science in a Free Society（New Left Books 1978）32ff，39.