Abstract
As an important corporate governance mechanism，compensation contract has been a principal-agent problem because of the power separation and information asymmetry. The phenomenon of “high salary”，the irrelevant between executive compensation and corporation performance has attracted more and more attention from shareholders and society，which caused that governments have issued executive compensation policies to impact and governance constantly. As one means of compensation management，executive compensation policies have grown out from nothing and updated constantly. Limited to qualitative analysis，related literature research is not deep and the conclusion is not uniform. By arranging the objectives of the compensation policies，I found that government intervention balances compensation performance sensitivity with compensation equity. Based on this background，I will explore the governance role of executive compensation policy from two aspects：compensation performance sensitivity and compensation equity.
In order to enhance efficiency of executive compensation and to provide evidence for testing government regulation. The compensation policy is divided into compensation disclosure policy and compensation regulation policy. Taking the A-share listed companies which is non-financial in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2000 to 2015 as samples，this paper uses the Mediating Effect Test to reveal the impact and transmission path of executive compensation disclosure on compensation performance sensitivity；Then，use Double Difference Method of propensity score matching（PSM-DID）to examine the impact of compensation regulation policy on compensation equity（internal equity and external equity）as well as the subsequent value incentive effects；Further consider the relationship between the effects between different executive compensation policies.
Taking the compensation performance sensitivity as the criterion，this book tests the effectiveness of the executive compensation disclosure policy. The results show that there is an asymmetry relationship between the compensation information disclosure and compensation performance sensitivity in non-state-owned enterprises. The information disclosure of executive compensation reduces pay-performance sensitivity through compensation bandwagon，and promotes compensation performance sensitivity through investment efficiency in excessive incentive samples. Further research shows that the conduction path of the effect of compensation disclosure policy varies among different types of companies.
Through analyzing the effectiveness of executive compensation regulation policy，the findings are as follows，the compensation regulation significantly improves the internal equity of the local state-owned enterprise. However，compensation regulation also increases the on-the-job consumption of local-government-owned enterprises. Further analysis indicates that both compensation equity and on-the-job consumption can affect the company’s value.
Further analyzes of the relationship between the executive compensation effects show that：The relationship between the two policy effects is complementary to each other in our country in local state-owned enterprise，and the relationship mainly comes from the internal equity. However，the external equity reduces the compensation performance sensitivity instead in non-state-owned enterprises. Different policy implementation periods affect the overall effect of executive compensation policy.
The possible innovation of the article includes the following aspects：First，this book enriched the literature of executive compensation incentive based the perspective of macro regulation；and provided a systematical research on the effectiveness of compensation policies，reveal the intrinsic mechanism of effect implementation through exploring the path of government’s macro-governance of executive compensation.
The conclusions inspire us that the government should consider the characteristics of the company，the characteristics of executives’ human capital，and pay attention to the relationship between the effects of policies when they make the executive compensation policies.
Keywords：executive compensation policy，compensation performance sensitivity，compensation equity，effectiveness