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理论篇

Blank Spots in Collective Memory：A Case Study of Russia

James V.Wertsch [1]

Abstract：The dynamics of collective remembering are examined by analyzing what happens when a “blank spot” in history is filled with information that had previously not been available or publicly acknowledged. Taking Russian accounts of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 as a case study，it is argued that “schematic narrative templates” that shape deep collec-tive memory give rise to a tendency to maintain this memory and help it overcome the “narrative rift” that occurs when embarrassing episodes from the past are publicly acknowledged.Schematic narrative templates are set forth as underlying strong conservative forces that resist change in collective memory at a deep level.It is suggested that debates grounded in formal history may help overcome this resistance to change but that such efforts will be limited as long as the forces of deep collective memory are not recognized.

Keywords：Collective Memory National Narrative Russia Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The Soviet Union was well known for treating certain episodes and personalities in its history as “blank spots.” In some cases，these were literally blank，as in photos where people’s images had been painstakingly airbrushed out of existence（King，1997）；in other instances，the notion was more figurative，having to do with what could—and could not—be discussed in a public setting. Regardless of their form，these blank spots were understood by Soviet citizens as involving something that could not be mentioned—even when they dealt with someone who had been at the center of public discourse just the day before. During the last few decades of the Soviet Union’s existence，these blank spots in history became the object of increasing debate and protest，at least in private settings. Indeed，some people thought，perhaps naively，that if these blank spots could only be publicly acknowledged and filled with accurate information，truth would then replace falsehood and omission once and for all.

For many people living in the Baltic region of the former Soviet Union，the most obvious blank spot in history was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. For decades there had been little doubt in their minds that this infamous pact included secret protocols that lay behind the forced annexation of Estonia，Latvia，and Lithuania by Soviet forces in 1940. However，the existence of these protocols was officially denied by Soviet leaders，including Mikhail Gorbachev，up until the final years of the USSR’s existence. While enjoined from discussing this matter in public，many Estonians，Latvians，and Lithuanians were insistent，at least in private，that this was an episode of forced annexation and violence，the memory of which would not be lost，and the true story of which would eventually come out.

In what follows，I shall examine Russian accounts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In particular，I shall be concerned with the pact’s secret protocols in which Hitler and Stalin agreed to carve up Eastern Europe，and I shall argue that in post-Soviet Russia，the transformation of the memory of this pact did not occur in a single step yielding a final，fixed account. Instead，it involved a process of change that has undergone two stages，and this change has given rise to an account that is clearly not what the people of the Baltic countries remember. I shall also argue that to account for the dynamics of this transformation it is useful to invoke the notions of “schematic narrative templates” and “deep collective memory.”

I base my analysis on an examination of high school history textbooks from Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. As I have noted elsewhere（Wertsch，2002），text-books are only one reflection of a wider set of cultural and political processes involved in defining official history，and as such they compete with other sources of information，like film and the popular press，for impact on young generations. They provide a good starting point，however，for examining official，state-sanctioned accounts of the past.

The first question to pose about these accounts is whether they really are about history，at least history in any strict sense of the term. Instead of speaking of blank spots in history，it will become obvious that it may be more appropriate to speak of blank spots in collective memory. In reality，“history” instruction in Soviet and post-Soviet schools—as well as in virtually every other country in the world—involves a complex mixture of what professional historians would consider to be a sound interpretation of past events based on the objective，balanced review of evidence on one hand，and an effort，on the other，to promulgate collective memory，or a usable past，as part of a national identity project. In this context，notions of history and collective memory clearly overlap. Both ways of representing the past deal with events occurring before the lifetime of the people doing the representing，and in both cases there is the assumption that the accounts being presented are true. Furthermore，both rely on narratives as “cultural tools”（Wertsch，1998）. The upshot is that it is often difficult to separate history from collective memory，and what we routinely call “history” textbooks almost always involve a mixture of the two.

This，however，does not mean that no useful distinction can be made between history and collective memory. Indeed，it is essential to distinguish between them. The father of modern collective memory studies，Maurice Halbwachs（1980，1992） made this point in the 1920s in his discussion of “formal history” and how it differs from collective memory. Before Halbwachs’ time it came up in other discussions；for example，it was an object of debate in the nineteenth century in writings by the philosopher Ernest Renan（1882/1990），who viewed serious historical research as often posing a threat to popular efforts at collective remembering.

In contemporary debates，this discussion has continued in historiography，where history and collective memory are often viewed not just as different，but as being in basic conflict. The reason for this is the different aspirations of the two modes of relating to the past. For its part，history aspires to provide an objective and distanced（i.e.，non-“presentist”） account of the past，even if this means giving up favored and often self-serving narratives. In contrast，collective remembering inevitably involves some identity project in the present—remembering in the service of constructing a preferred image of a group—and is resistant to change even in the face of contradictory evidence. As Assmann（1997，9） noted，in collective remembering “the past is not simply ‘received’ by the present. The present is ‘haunted’ by the past and the past is modeled，invented，reinvented，and reconstructed by the present.”

In short，formal history and collective memory must be kept distinct for several reasons. Collective memory tends to reflect a single，subjective，committed per-spective of a group in the present，whereas formal history strives to be objective and to distance itself from the present and any particular perspective currently in favor. In addition，collective memory leaves little room for doubt or ambiguity about events and the motivations of actors（Novick，1999），whereas formal history strives to take into account multiple，complex factors and motives that shape events.

A final property that characterizes collective remembering is that it tends to be heavily shaped by “schemata”（Bartlett，1932/1995），“implicit theories”（Ross 1989），or other simplifying organizational frameworks. To be sure，such frameworks also shape formal history，but in the case of collective memory they take on a particu-larly important role，meaning that accounts of the past often are quite schematic and include little in the way of detailed information，especially information that conflicts with the basic narrative that supports an identity project. In collective remembering，such conflicting evidence is often distorted，simplified，and ignored.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact：A Soviet Account

This brief review of the difference between formal history and collective memory has several implications for understanding the transformation in the Russian view of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As will become apparent，most of what I have to say about this view reflects the pressures of collective memory.

However，the key to overcoming some of the problems that emerge from these pressures may lie with formal history.

Formal history and collective memory must be kept distinct for several reasons. Collective memory tends to reflect a single，subjective，committed perspective of a group in the present，whereas formal history strives to be objective and to distance itself from the present and any particular perspective currently in favor.

I begin my analysis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the official Soviet account from that period. From the perspective of this account，there is nothing to say about the secret protocols of the pact since they simply did not exist：the fact that the Baltic countries became part of the USSR had nothing to do with spheres of influence or any other form of external coercion. Instead，their annexation grew out of uprisings by the workers and peasants in these countries who desired to be part of the Soviet Union. In A Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union （1970），for example，the “nonaggression pact” was presented as follows：

In August 1939 Hitler’s government proposed a non-aggression pact to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Union was threatened with war on two fronts—in Europe and the Far East—and was completely isolated. The Soviet Government，therefore，agreed to make a pact of non-aggression with Germany. Subsequent events revealed that this step was the only correct one under the circumstances. By taking it the USSR was able to continue peaceful construction for nearly two years and to strengthen its defenses.（p.247）

Given that there were no secret protocols in this version of the events of 1939，the subsequent inclusion of the Baltic countries in the Soviet Union was not treated as being part of the story of the non-aggression pact. Instead，it was an event that arose due to a completely independent set of forces grounded in quite different motives. As outlined in that same text：

In 1940，when the threat of German invasion loomed over Lithuania，Latvia，and Estonia，and their reactionary governments were preparing to make a deal with Hitler，the peoples of these countries overthrew their rulers，restored Soviet power and joined the USSR.（p.247）

From this perspective，the fact that the Baltic countries became part of the USSR in 1940 was part of a Marxist-Leninist story of class struggle，a story that ended with the restoration of Soviet power. Indeed，this passage suggests that the period of independence in Estonia，Latvia，and Lithuania in the 1920s and 1930s was somehow unnatural and that once oppression had been removed，the people in these countries returned to their natural progressive path，joining the international march of socialist countries.

Narrative Rift as Step 1 in Post-Soviet Revision

With perestroika—and especially Gorbachev’s admission in 1989 that the secret protocols had been part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact，the old Soviet version of the events of 1939 and 1940 could no longer serve as an official account. It had to be revised，a process that had already begun in the final years of Soviet power. For example，in a 1989 high school history textbook（one that still took the USSR as its object of study），Korablëv，Fedosov，and Borisov（1989） wrote：

The territorial composition of the country changed. Its borders were extended to the west. In 1939 the land and populations of Ukraine and Belorussia underwent reunification. In 1940 Romania returned to the composition of the USSR Bessarabia，which had been torn away in 1918. This led to the formation of the Moldovian SSR instead of an autonomous republic. As a result of complex processes of international and internal development Soviet power was established anew in Latvia，Lithuania，and Estonia，which entered the composition of the USSR in 1940.

However，in the new regions entering the USSR，breaches of the law characteristic for those years of the abuse of power were tolerated along with democratic revolutionary transformations.

All of this made the situation more complicated in these regions. It had a negative effect on people’s psychological state and at the same time on the military preparedness of the USSR.（p.348）

The first and perhaps most striking feature that distinguishes this from previous Soviet accounts is that the absorption of Latvia，Lithuania，and Estonia into the USSR was no longer formulated in Marxist-Leninist terms. There is no mention of “reactionary rulers” and so forth. Indeed，there is a great deal that is critical— at least implicitly—of Soviet power. Mention of “breaches of the law characteristic for those years of the abuse of power” is something that was simply unimaginable in official Soviet accounts. Instead of focusing on the glories of the Soviet Union through the desired vision of the party，this account allows that mistakes were made.

Another striking feature of this account is its awkwardness and ambiguity. It contains formulations that are so clumsy as to make the evasions obvious，if not laughable. In particular，the extensive use of the passive voice made it possible to avoid specifying as to who was responsible for the actions. By refusing to assign agency，the authors created an account in which things just seemed to happen on their own.

For people of the Baltic countries，expressions like “as a result of complex processes of international and internal development Soviet power was established” or “the territorial composition of the country changed” amount to evasion and attempts to avoid telling the truth. From this perspective，statements such as “all of this made the situation more complicated in these regions” are certainly true，but the prevarication involved is so great that the comments raise more questions than they answer.

The obvious awkwardness in this passage derives from a fundamental contradiction in the official Soviet account of the late 1980s in the USSR. On one hand，there was a need to acknowledge that events，the existence of which had previously been denied，had in fact occurred. It was no longer possible，for example，to deny the existence of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. On the other hand，there was no agreement on what the larger story was now supposed to be. How would the basic “narrative truth”（Mink，1978） of an official Soviet account change now that it could no longer be built around the claim that the party was always right in leading the march to a glorious future for international socialism？ Would newly released archival evidence force Russia to create a new narrative that would cast the USSR as an imperialist power not unlike pre-revolutionary Russia？

Answers to such questions were still very unclear in 1989，and officials were apparently nervous at that time about making statements that could come back to haunt them. As a result，they seem to have arrived at an unsatisfactory compromise：they would include newly acknowledged information in official Soviet accounts of history but would not rewrite the basic narrative. The result was that new information appeared in a way that was inconsistent with the general flow of the text. It was as if this new information concerning the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had appeared out of nowhere in the official account and that the authors had no idea how to weave it into the text. The fact that the meaning of events is largely shaped by the narrative in which they are enmeshed（Mink，1978），however，made this compromise unlikely to be satisfactory or stable，and this was indeed the case.

Narrative Repair as Step 2 in Post-Soviet Revision

Awkwardness and disjointedness characterized the first step in moving beyond Soviet accounts of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact；during the second stage a kind of “narrative repair” emerged to reestablish coherence based on a new narrative. As was the case in step 1 of the revision process，this new version moved beyond official Soviet accounts in that it made no attempt to deny the existence of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Indeed，it freely admitted them. It also moved beyond the awkward and evasive formulation that characterized the narrative rift in step 1.

The narrative repair that occurred at this stage involved a story that might be titled “Stalin’s Difficult Choice”. This narrative took several forms in the emergence of post-Soviet Russian collective memory of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact，and in fact several of its elements had long been part of the discussion of Stalin’s actions leading up to World War II. Hence，using it in the late Soviet period amounted to dusting off some existing “off-the-shelf” narrative tools and putting them to new use in official discourse.

An early post-Soviet version of “The Difficult Choice” narrative can be found in a 1998 history textbook for ninth-graders by Danilov and Kosulina.

A difficult choice.... While not giving up on a resolution of the “Polish question” through force，Hitler also proposed to the USSR to begin negotiations toward concluding an agreement of non-aggression and dividing up spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Stalin was confronted with a difficult choice：either reject Hitler’s proposal，thereby agreeing to have German forces move to the borders of the USSR in case Poland was defeated in a war with Germany，or conclude an agreement with Germany that would provide the possibility for pushing borders back from its west and avoid war for some time.... And thus the agreement was signed. On August 23，1939 the entire world was shocked by the news that the USSR and Nazi Germany had signed a treaty of non-aggression. This was also wholly unexpected for the Soviet people. But no one knew the most important fact—secret protocols had been added to this treaty. In these secret protocols Moscow and Berlin divided up Eastern Europe among themselves into spheres of influence....In the fall of 1939 the Soviet Union concluded treaties of mutual assistance with Estonia，Latvia，and Lithuania. In accordance with these treaties Soviet forces were introduced into these countries. In the summer of 1940 the Soviet leadership，using propitious external conditions，demanded that the Baltic countries accede to the introduction of additional forces，a replacement of governments，and emergency parliamentary elections.... The new organs of power，which had been selected under the control of Soviet representatives，turned to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with the request to receive Lithuania，Latvia，Estonia，and Besarabia into the composition of the Soviet Union. This request was of course granted，and on the map of the USSR there appeared new union republics：the Latvian，Lithuanian，Estonian，and Moldavian Republics. In this fashion，almost all the western provinces that had earlier been in the Russian empire，with the exception of Poland and Finland，were returned.（pp.324-326）

In contrast to official Soviet accounts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact，this text does not deny the existence of the secret protocols. Indeed，it highlights them. And in contrast to the narrative rift characteristic of step 1，there is relatively little awkwardness or prevarication in this case，although some，to be sure，remains. Instead，the events are represented in such a way that the motives that lay behind them are no longer an embarrassment to Russian collective memory. “The Difficult Choice” story made it possible to explain events that had previously either been omitted or had given rise to awkwardness and a narrative rift in official Soviet accounts. The secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were presented as a decision forced on the Soviet Union by the fact that Germany was about to attack Poland，allowing the German army to approach the borders of the USSR. And the choice is presented as somehow easier by the fact that the USSR was returning to borders that had previously defined the Russian Empire. But the main thrust of such accounts is that even though the Soviet Union was reluctant to expand its borders，it was simply forced to do so to ensure the defeat of a German nation that was a threat to the entire world.

Before turning to the forces that gave rise to the narrative repair in step 2，it is worth emphasizing that “The Difficult Choice” story is by no means the only one that can be imagined about these events. For example，one Baltic version of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has disputed the assertion that it lessened the chance of war between Germany and the Soviet Union，arguing instead that “it was one of the direct causes of World War II”（Vizulis 1988，vii）. And Kestutis Girnius（1989） has argued that instead of seeking to create a buffer against German invasion，the pact was motivated by long-standing tendencies of Russian territorial expansionism.

There is little doubt that the Soviet government hoped to profit from the growth of tensions in Eastern Europe to regain land that was formerly part of the Russian empire. The Soviet Union made clear its interest in the Baltics in the early stages of its negotiations with France and Great Britain. Soviet negotiators were so insistent on the matter that they were willing to risk a breakdown in the talks rather than renounce their aims. German willingness to satisfy demands that the Western democracies would not countenance seems to have been an important factor in determining Moscow’s decision to cooperate with the Nazis.（p.2）

Interpretations such as these are what people in the Baltic countries hoped would emerge and be widely accepted once the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were made public. However，the narrative repair in post-Soviet Russian collective memory clearly did not move in this direction. It instead moved steadfastly toward one or another version of “The Difficult Choice” story.

The “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies” Schematic Narrative Template

Some observers would attribute this turn of events in the revision of official Russian collective memory to transparent and defensive self-interest. But the process involved is more subtle and deep-seated than a conscious effort to avoid facing new evidence，and recognizing this will be key to transcending the endless disputes over the past that emerge in such cases.

The process of revision in this instance reflects underlying forces connected with a “schematic narrative template”（Wertsch，2002） that is an essential part the national identity and worldview of Russia. The narrative in this case is schematic in the sense that it exists at an abstract level involving few details about specific actors，times，places，and so forth；it is a template in the sense that this abstract form provides a pattern for interpreting multiple episodes from the past. Schematic narrative templates stand in contrast to “specific narratives”（Wertsch，2002） that name concrete dates，actors，locations，and so forth. The textbook passages cited above are examples of specific narratives.

The notion of a schematic narrative template stems from writings in folklore（Propp，1968），psychology（Bartlett，1932/1995；Ross，1989），and other disciplines. Interpretations of the past are heavily shaped by the abstract meaning of structures and schemas associated with cultural tools used by members of a collective. This means that detailed information，especially that which contradicts a general perspective，is distorted，simplified，and ignored，something that stands in contrast to formal history，or at least its aspirations（Wertsch，2002）.

Arguing in the tradition of Vygotsky（1981，1987），Bakhtin（1986），and others，I take schematic narrative templates to be structures that emerge out of the repeated use of a standard set of specific narratives in history instruction，the popular media，and so forth. The narrative templates that take shape in this process are especially effective in organizing what we can say and think，both because they are largely unnoticed by，or “transparent” to，those employing them and because they are a fundamental part of the identity claims of a group. The result is that these templates act as powerful “coauthors” when we attempt to tell what “really happened” in the past（Wertsch，2002）.

Narrative templates that take shape in this process are especially effective in organizing what we can say and think，both because they are largely unnoticed by，or “transparent” to，those employing them and because they are a fundamental part of the identity claims of a group.

The schematic narrative template at work in the case of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is one that occupies a central place in Russians’ understanding of crucial historical episodes. It can be titled the “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies” narrative template，and it imposes a basic plot structure on a range of specific characters，events，and circumstances. This narrative template includes the following elements：

1. An initial situation in which Russia is peaceful and not interfering with others.

2. The initiation of trouble in which a foreign enemy treacherously and viciously attacks Russia without provocation.

3. Russia almost loses everything in total defeat as it suffers from the enemy’s attempts to destroy it as a civilization.

4. Through heroism，and against all odds，Russia triumphs and succeeds in expelling the foreign enemy，thus justifying its claims of exceptionalism and its status as a great nation.

At first glance it may appear that there is nothing peculiarly Russian about this narrative template. For example，by replacing “Russian” with “American，” at least the first two elements would seem to be consistent with American collective memory of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The claim is not that this narrative template is used only by members of the Russian mnemonic community or that it is the only one available to them. However，there are several indications that it plays a particularly important role and takes on a particular form in this case.

The first of these concerns its ubiquity. Whereas the United States and many other societies have accounts of past events that are compatible with this narrative template，it seems to be employed more widely in the Russian tradition than elsewhere. In this connection，consider the comments of Musatova（2002） about the cultural history of Russia. In a passing remark about the fate of having to learn “the lessons of conquests and enslavement by foreigners”（p.139），she lists several groups who are viewed as having perpetrated similar events in Russia’s history：“Tatars，Germans，Swedes，Poles，Turks，Germans again”（p.139）. This comment suggests that while the particular actors，dates，and setting may change，the same basic plot applies to all these episodes. They are all stamped out of the same basic template.

Some observers would go so far as to say that the “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies” narrative template is the underlying story of Russian collective remembering，and this provides a basic point of contrast with other groups. For example，it is strikingly different from American items such as the “Mystique of Manifest Destiny”（Lowenthal 1994，53） or a “Reluctant Hegemon” story（Kagan，2006）. The “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies” narrative template plays a central role in Russian collective memory，even in instances where it would not seem relevant，at least to those who are not native speakers（Lotman and Uspenskii，1985） of this tradition. For example，in post-Soviet Russia communism has often been portrayed as a foreign enemy that invaded Russia and had to be expelled after nearly destroying the nation.

All this is not to say that this narrative template has no grounding in actual his-torical experience. It clearly does reflect traumatic events and experiences from Russia’s past. At the same time，however，it is important to recognize that this is a cultural and cognitive construction，a particular way of pursuing what Bartlett（1932/1995） called the “effort after meaning，” and hence not the only possible way to interpret events such as signing the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As already noted，people from places like Estonia，Latvia，and Lithuania have quite different interpretations of this event，and the basic tenets of these alternative interpretations directly contradict many of those in the Russian version.

This Russian effort after meaning appears to have had a powerful hand in shaping narrative repair in the case of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The acknowledgement of these protocols initially was an embarrassment to official narrative，but this did not lead to the kind of fundamental and permanent transformation that had long been envisioned by people in the Baltic countries. Instead，after an initial period of confusion and prevarication，characterized by narrative rift，this schematic narrative template reasserted its power and gave rise to “The Difficult Choice” story，an account that among other things seems to be aimed at precluding alternative interpretations of events such as those based on Russian expansionism.

Conclusion：The Conservatism of Collective Memory

In looking at the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact，I have pur-posefully chosen a case where one might expect a fundamental revision in collective memory. People in the Baltic countries，as well as elsewhere，had expected—or at least hoped—that making these secret protocols public would be a sufficiently powerful embarrassment to existing Russian accounts to lead to such a revision. What turned out to be the case，however，was something quite different. After an initial period of relatively superficial disruption in the official narrative（i.e.，the narrative rift of step 1），an account emerged that smoothed over the awkwardness and prevarication of the narratives of that period.

I have argued that this narrative repair in step 2 was heavily shaped by a cultural tool that mediates deep collective memory in Russia，namely，the “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies” schematic narrative template. Like schematic narrative templates in any society，this one reflects a particular worldview and interpretative perspective in the effort after meaning. The power of this perspective is obvious to those with competing interpretations of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. However，because schematic narrative templates operate at a nonconscious level and are especially transparent to their users，members of the Russian mnemonic community usually operate on the assumption that they are simply telling what really happened rather than coauthoring an account with a narrative tool.

The fact that the Expulsion of Foreign Enemies storyline is so jarring to others provides a reminder of the strong emotional attachment and identity commitments typically associated with such narrative templates. They are by no means neutral cognitive instruments. Instead，they are cultural tools deeply embedded in the more general project of developing and maintaining an image that supports a collective identity.

All this is not to deny the noticeable change in textbook accounts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact during the late Soviet and post-Soviet years，beginning with a period of apparent unease over how to rewrite the narrative in light of the acknowledgment of the secret protocols. However，this initial step did not last long，and perhaps more important，the new version of the secret protocols that eventually emerged was not the sort of basic revision in an official account that people in the Baltics had hoped for. Instead，the narrative repair that characterizes step 2 amounted to patching over the rift created by acknowledging the secret protocols. It did this by embedding them in an effort after meaning，the general underlying pattern of which was already well established.

These developments suggest that deep collective memory is very conservative and resistant to change，something that runs counter to observations about the radically new public versions of the past that emerged with the breakup of the USSR. It is indeed important to recognize that post-Soviet Russian history text-books include assertions that would have landed their authors in prison a few decades earlier. However，focusing on this alone fails to take into account the important difference between a surface level of narrative organization，where radical changes in specific narratives may be found，and the schematic narrative templates that mediate deep collective memory. While the specific narratives about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact may have changed in some surprising and seemingly radical ways，the underlying schematic narrative has been a very conservative force.

This would appear to be sobering if not depressing news for those dedicated to overcoming differences and resolving conflict between groups. Are people in countries like Estonia and Russia doomed to continued，intractable opposition over interpretations of the past？ Is this the case for places like India and Pakistan or Turkey and Armenia as well？ Efforts by historians in these and other such troubled cases suggest that one way forward may be to switch the discussion away from collective memory and toward a heavier reliance on formal history. As noted earlier，official accounts found in history textbooks are typically a mixture of the two，but the relative contributions from each may vary widely. When trying to resolve differences over the interpretation of past events，one useful means may be to introduce a heavier dose of objectivity and complexity into such textbooks.

Professional historians such as Romila Thapar（2005） in India and Taner Aksam（2007） in the case of Turkey have stepped forward in recent years to argue that professional historians must reassert control of at least part of the public discourse about the past. This would involve shifting the discussion away from narratives that support emotionally laden identity claims toward narratives whose standing rests on a more balanced，objective consideration of evidence. This suggests a different role for historians than is often assumed in academic discourse，and some historians resist precisely because they fear that it could lead to the elision of the distinction between collective memory and formal history that they have been so assiduous in maintaining.

Principled and courageous attempts to introduce the rigor of formal history into discussions about the past do seem to provide some hope for moving debates between opposing perspectives to a calmer and more productive plane. However，this is hardly a panacea，given that historians themselves often cannot agree over what narrative applies to past events. As Cronon（1992） has noted，two competent professional historians can use the same basic archives and “facts” to arrive at quite different historical accounts，and this reflects the basic claim by philosophers of history such as Mink（1978） that no amount of objective evidence can alone reveal the narrative that must be told about the past.

Hence，a move toward formal historical analysis may be an important step in overcoming intractable differences between groups’ understanding of the past，but an appreciation of the deep memory of each group may be another necessary component. A failure to recognize the powerful conservative forces of narrative templates as an inherent part of the process may mean that even the best efforts to resolve differences based on formal historical analysis are destined to fail.

If the events surrounding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact show anything，they show that people are not likely to arrive at a common understanding of the past simply because they are exposed to a common body of objective information. Given how central deep memory is to collective identity，this should be no surprise. So the best hope we may have is to recognize the existence and power of the narrative templates as a first step and then proceed to harness formal history in an effort to adjudicate differences over “what really happened” in the past.

Notes

1. The two major works by Halbwachs in English，On Collective Memory （1992） and The Collective Memory （1980），are compilations of French publications from the 1920s，1930s，and early 1940s. Halbwachs died in Buchenwald concentration camp shortly before the end of World War Ⅱ.

2. Note that Stalin and associates like Molotov were out of official favor in 1970 and hence no longer appeared in such accounts.

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[1] James V.Wertsch is Marshall S.Snow Professor of Arts and Sciences at Washington University in St.Louis，where he is also director of the McDonnell International Scholars Academy.His current research is concerned with language，thought，and culture，with a special focus on collective memory，national narratives and identity，and culture.His most recent book is Voices of Collective Remembering，Cambridge University Press，2002.
Note：An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference “Memory and War” at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in January 2003.The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
DOI：10.1177/0002716207312870.