第3章
THE SENTIMENTS AND MORALITY OF CROWDS 群体的情感和道德观
1. Impulsiveness, mobility, and irritability of crowds. The crowd is at the mercy of all exterior exciting causes, and reflects their incessant variations — The impulses which the crowd obeys are so imperious as to annihilate the feeling of personal interest — Premeditation is absent from crowds — Racial influence.
2. Crowds are credulous and readily influenced by suggestion. The obedience of crowds to suggestions — The images evoked in the mind of crowds are accepted by them as realities — Why these images are identical for all the individuals composing a crowd — The equality of the educated and the ignorant man in a crowd — Various examples of the illusions to which the individuals in a crowd are subject — The impossibility of according belief to the testimony of crowds — The unanimity of numerous witnesses is one of the worst proofs that can be invoked to establish a fact— The slight value of works of history.
3. The exaggeration and ingenuousness of the sentiments of crowds. Crowds do not admit doubt or uncertainty, and always go to extremes — Their sentiments always excessive.
4. The intolerance, dictatorialness, and conservatism of crowds. The reasons of these sentiments — The servility of crowds in the face of a strong authority — The momentary revolutionary instincts of crowds do not prevent them from being extremely conservative — Crowds instinctively hostile to changes and progress.
5. The morality of crowds. The morality of crowds, according to the suggestions under which they act, may be much lower or much higher than that of the individuals composing them — Explanation and examples — Crowds rarely guided by those considerations of interest which are most often the exclusive motives of the isolated individual — The moralising role of crowds.
HAVING indicated in a general way the principal characteristics of crowds, it remains to study these characteristics in detail.
It will be remarked that among the special characteristics of crowds there are several — such as impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments, and others besides — which are almost always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution — in women, savages, and children, for instance. However, I merely indicate this analogy in passing; its demonstration is outside the scope of this work. It would, moreover, be useless for persons acquainted with the psychology of primitive beings, and would scarcely carry conviction to those in ignorance of this matter.
I now proceed to the successive consideration of the different characteristics that may be observed in the majority of crowds.
1. IMPULSIVENESS, MOBILITY, AND IRRITABILITY OF CROWDS When studying the fundamental characteristics of a crowd we stated that it is guided almost exclusively by unconscious motives. Its acts are far more under the influence of the spinal cord than of the brain. In this respect a crowd is closely akin to quite primitive beings. The acts performed may be perfect so far as their execution is concerned, but as they are not directed by the brain, the individual conducts himself according as the exciting causes to which he is submitted may happen to decide. A crowd is at the mercy of all external exciting causes, and reflects their incessant variations. It is the slave of the impulses which it receives. The isolated individual may be submitted to the same exciting causes as the man in a crowd, but as his brain shows him the inadvisability of yielding to them, he refrains from yielding. This truth may be physiologically expressed by saying that the isolated individual possesses the capacity of dominating his reflex actions, while a crowd is devoid of this capacity.
The varying impulses to which crowds obey may be, according to their exciting causes, generous or cruel, heroic or cowardly, but they will always be so imperious that the interest of the individual, even the interest of self-preservation, will not dominate them. The exciting causes that may act on crowds being so varied, and crowds always obeying them, crowds are in consequence extremely mobile. This explains how it is that we see them pass in a moment from the most bloodthirsty ferocity to the most extreme generosity and heroism. A crowd may easily enact the part of an executioner, but not less easily that of a martyr. It is crowds that have furnished the torrents of blood requisite for the triumph of every belief. It is not necessary to go back to the heroic ages to see what crowds are capable of in this latter direction. They are never sparing of their life in an insurrection, and not long since a general, [3]becoming suddenly popular, might easily have found a hundred thousand men ready to sacrifice their lives for his cause had he demanded it.
Any display of premeditation by crowds is in consequence out of the question. They may be animated in succession by the most contrary sentiments, but they will always be under the influence of the exciting causes of the moment. They are like the leaves which a tempest whirls up and scatters in every direction and then allows to fall. When studying later on certain revolutionary crowds we shall give some examples of the variability of their sentiments.
This mobility of crowds renders them very difficult to govern, especially when a measure of public authority has fallen into their hands. Did not the necessities of everyday life constitute a sort of invisible regulator of existence, it would scarcely be possible for democracies to last. Still, though the wishes of crowds are frenzied they are not durable. Crowds are as incapable of willing as of thinking for any length of time.
A crowd is not merely impulsive and mobile. Like a savage, it is not prepared to admit that anything can come between its desire and the realisation of its desire. It is the less capable of understanding such an intervention, in consequence of the feeling of irresistible power given it by its numerical strength. The notion of impossibility disappears for the individual in a crowd. An isolated individual knows well enough that alone he cannot set fire to a palace or loot a shop, and should he be tempted to do so, he will easily resist the temptation. Making part of a crowd, he is conscious of the power given him by number, and it is sufficient to suggest to him ideas of murder or pillage for him to yield immediately to temptation. An unexpected obstacle will be destroyed with frenzied rage. Did the human organism allow of the perpetuity of furious passion, it might be said that the normal condition of a crowd baulked in its wishes is just such a state of furious passion.
The fundamental characteristics of the race, which constitute the unvarying source from which all our sentiments spring, always exert an influence on the irritability of crowds, their impulsiveness and their mobility, as on all the popular sentiments we shall have to study. All crowds are doubtless always irritable and impulsive, but with great variations of degree. For instance, the difference between a Latin and an Anglo-Saxon crowd is striking. The most recent facts in French history throw a vivid light on this point. The mere publication, twenty-five years ago, of a telegram, relating an insult supposed to have been offered an ambassador, was sufficient to determine an explosion of fury, whence followed immediately a terrible war. Some years later the telegraphic announcement of an insignificant reverse at Langson provoked a fresh explosion which brought about the instantaneous overthrow of the government. At the same moment a much more serious reverse undergone by the English expedition to Khartoum produced only a slight emotion in England, and no ministry was overturned. Crowds are everywhere distinguished by feminine characteristics, but Latin crowds are the most feminine of all. Whoever trusts in them may rapidly attain a lofty destiny, but to do so is to be perpetually skirting the brink of a Tarpeian rock, with the certainty of one day being precipitated from it.
2. THE SUGGESTIBILITY AND CREDULITY OF CROWDS
When defining crowds, we said that one of their general characteristics was an excessive suggestibility, and we have shown to what an extent suggestions are contagious in every human agglomeration; a fact which explains the rapid turning of the sentiments of a crowd in a definite direction. However indifferent it may be supposed, a crowd, as a rule, is in a state of expectant attention, which renders suggestion easy. The first suggestion formulated which arises implants itself immediately by a process of contagion in the brains of all assembled, and the identical bent of the sentiments of the crowd is immediately an accomplished fact.
As is the case with all persons under the influence of suggestion, the idea which has entered the brain tends to transform itself into an act. Whether the act is that of setting fire to a palace, or involves self-sacrifice, a crowd lends itself to it with equal facility.All will depend on the nature of the exciting cause, and no longer, as in the case of the isolated individual, on the relations existing between the act suggested and the sum total of the reasons which may be urged against its realisation.
In consequence, a crowd perpetually hovering on the borderland of unconsciousness, readily yielding to all suggestions, having all the violence of feeling peculiar to beings who cannot appeal to the influence of reason, deprived of all critical faculty, cannot be otherwise than excessively credulous. The improbable does not exist for a crowd, and it is necessary to bear this circumstance well in mind to understand the facility with which are created and propagated the most improbable legends and stories.[4]
The creation of the legends which so easily obtain circulation in crowds is not solely the consequence of their extreme credulity. It is also the result of the prodigious perversions that events undergo in the imagination of a throng. The simplest event that comes under the observation of a crowd is soon totally transformed. A crowd thinks in images, and the image itself immediately calls up a series of other images, having no logical connection with the first. We can easily conceive this state by thinking of the fantastic succession of ideas to which we are sometimes led by calling up in our minds any fact. Our reason shows us the incoherence there is in these images, but a crowd is almost blind to this truth, and confuses with the real event what the deforming action of its imagination has superimposed thereon. A crowd scarcely distinguishes between the subjective and the objective. It accepts as real the images evoked in its mind, though they most often have only a very distant relation with the observed fact.
The ways in which a crowd perverts any event of which it is a witness ought, it would seem, to be innumerable and unlike each other, since the individuals composing the gathering are of very different temperaments. But this is not the case. As the result of contagion the perversions are of the same kind, and take the same shape in the case of all the assembled individuals.
The first perversion of the truth effected by one of the individuals of the gathering is the starting-point of the contagious suggestion. Before St. George appeared on the walls of Jerusalem to all the Crusaders he was certainly perceived in the first instance by one of those present. By dint of suggestion and contagion the miracle signalised by a single person was immediately accepted by all.
Such is always the mechanism of the collective hallucinations so frequent in history— hallucinations which seem to have all the recognised characteristics of authenticity,since they are phenomena observed by thousands of persons.
To combat what precedes, the mental quality of the individuals composing a crowd must not be brought into consideration. This quality is without importance. From the moment that they form part of a crowd the learned man and the ignoramus are equally incapable of observation.
This thesis may seem paradoxical. To demonstrate it beyond doubt it would be necessary to investigate a great number of historical facts, and several volumes would be insufficient for the purpose.
Still, as I do not wish to leave the reader under the impression of unproved assertions, I shall give him some examples taken at hazard from the immense number of those that might be quoted.
The following fact is one of the most typical, because chosen from among collective hallucinations of which a crowd is the victim, in which are to be found individuals of every kind, from the most ignorant to the most highly educated. It is related incidentally by Julian Felix, a naval lieutenant, in his book on "Sea Currents, "and has been previously cited by the Revue Scientique.
The frigate, the Belle Poule, was cruising in the open sea for the purpose of finding the cruiser Le Berceau, from which she had been separated by a violent storm. It was broad daylight and in full sunshine. Suddenly the watch signalled a disabled vessel;the crew looked in the direction signalled, and every one, officers and sailors, clearly perceived a raft covered with men towed by boats which were displaying signals of distress. Yet this was nothing more than a collective hallucination. Admiral Desfosses lowered a boat to go to the rescue of the wrecked sailors. On nearing the object sighted, the sailors and officers on board the boat saw "masses of men in motion, stretching out their hands, and heard the dull and confused noise of a great number of voices." When the object was reached those in the boat found themselves simply and solely in the presence of a few branches of trees covered with leaves that had been swept out from the neighbouring coast. Before evidence so palpable the hallucination vanished.
The mechanism of a collective hallucination of the kind we have explained is clearly seen at work in this example. On the one hand we have a crowd in a state of expectant attention, on the other a suggestion made by the watch signalling a disabled vessel at sea, a suggestion which, by a process of contagion, was accepted by all those present, both officers and sailors.
It is not necessary that a crowd should be numerous for the faculty of seeing what is taking place before its eyes to be destroyed and for the real facts to be replaced by hallucinations unrelated to them. As soon as a few individuals are gathered together they constitute a crowd, and, though they should be distinguished men of learning,they assume all the characteristics of crowds with regard to matters outside their speciality. The faculty of observation and the critical spirit possessed by each of them individually at once disappears. An ingenious psychologist, Mr. Davey, supplies us with a very curious example in point, recently cited in the Annales des Sciences Psychiques, and deserving of relation here. Mr. Davey, having convoked a gathering of distinguished observers, among them one of the most prominent of English scientific men, Mr. Wallace, executed in their presence, and after having allowed them to examine the objects and to place seals where they wished, all the regulation spiritualistic phenomena, the materialisation of spirits, writing on slates, &c. Having subsequently obtained from these distinguished observers written reports admitting that the phenomena observed could only have been obtained by supernatural means, he revealed to them that they were the result of very simple tricks. "The most astonishing feature of Monsieur Davey's investigation, " writes the author of this account, "is not the marvellousness of the tricks themselves, but the extreme weakness of the reports made with respect to them by the non initiated witnesses. It is clear, then, " he says, "that witnesses even in number may give circumstantial relations which are completely erroneous, but whose result is that, if their descriptions are accepted as exact, the phenomena they describe are inexplicable by trickery. The methods invented by Mr. Davey were so simple that one is astonished that he should have had the boldness to employ them; but he had such a power over the mind of the crowd that he could persuade it that it saw what it did not see." Here, as always, we have the power of the hypnotiser over the hypnotised. Moreover, when this power is seen in action on minds of a superior order and previously invited to be suspicious, it is understandable how easy it is to deceive ordinary crowds.
Analogous examples are innumerable. As I write these lines the papers are full of the story of two little girls found drowned in the Seine. These children, to begin with, were recognised in the most unmistakable manner by half a dozen witnesses. All the affirmations were in such entire concordance that no doubt remained in the mind of the juge d'instruction. He had the certificate of death drawn up, but just as the burial of the children was to have been proceeded with, a mere chance brought about the discovery that the supposed victims were alive, and had, moreover, but a remote resemblance to the drowned girls. As in several of the examples previously cited, the affirmation of the first witness, himself a victim of illusion, had sufficed to influence the other witnesses.
In parallel cases the starting-point of the suggestion is always the illusion produced in an individual by more or less vague reminiscences, contagion following as the result of the affirmation of this initial illusion. If the first observer be very impressionable, it will often be sufficient that the corpse he believes he recognises should present — apart from all real resemblance — some peculiarity, a scar, or some detail of toilet which may evoke the idea of another person. The idea evoked may then become the nucleus of a sort of crystallisation which invades the understanding and paralyses all critical faculty. What the observer then sees is no longer the object itself, but the image-evoked in his mind. In this way are to be explained erroneous recognitions of the dead bodies of children by their own mother, as occurred in the following case, already old, but which has been recently recalled by the newspapers. In it are to be traced precisely the two kinds of suggestion of which I have just pointed out the mechanism.
"The child was recognised by another child, who was mistaken. The series of unwarranted recognitions then began.
"An extraordinary thing occurred. The day after a schoolboy had recognised the corpse a woman exclaimed, 'Good Heavens, it is my child! '
"She was taken up to the corpse; she examined the clothing, and noted a scar on the forehead. 'It is certainly, ' she said, 'my son who disappeared last July. He has been stolen from me and murdered.'
"The woman was concierge in the Rue du Four; her name was Chavandret. Her brother-in-law was summoned, and when questioned he said, 'That is the little Filibert.' Several persons living in the street recognised the child found at La Villette as Filibert Chavandret, among them being the boy's schoolmaster, who based his opinion on a medal worn by the lad.
"Nevertheless, the neighbours, the brother-in-law, the schoolmaster, and the mother were mistaken. Six weeks later the identity of the child was established. The boy, belonging to Bordeaux, had been murdered there and brought by a carrying company to Paris."[5]
It will be remarked that these recognitions are most often made by women and children — that is to say, by precisely the most impressionable persons. They show us at the same time what is the worth in law courts of such witnesses. As far as children, more especially, are concerned, their statements ought never to be invoked. Magistrates are in the habit of repeating that children do not lie. Did they possess a psychological culture a little less rudimentary than is the case they would know that, on the contrary, children invariably lie; the lie is doubtless innocent, but it is none the less a lie. It would be better to decide the fate of an accused person by the toss of a coin than, as has been so often done, by the evidence of a child.
To return to the faculty of observation possessed by crowds, our conclusion is that their collective observations are as erroneous as possible, and that most often they merely represent the illusion of an individual who, by a process of contagion, has suggestioned his fellows. Facts proving that the most utter mistrust of the evidence of crowds is advisable might be multiplied to any extent. Thousands of men were present twenty-five years ago at the celebrated cavalry charge during the battle of Sedan, and yet it is impossible, in the face of the most contradictory ocular testimony, to decide by whom it was commanded. The English general, Lord Wolseley, has proved in a recent book that up to now the gravest errors of fact have been committed with regard to the most important incidents of the battle of Waterloo — facts that hundreds of witnesses had nevertheless attested.[6]
Such facts show us what is the value of the testimony of crowds. Treatises on logic include the unanimity of numerous witnesses in the category of the strongest proofs that can be invoked in support of the exactness of a fact. Yet what we know of the psychology of crowds shows that treatises on logic need on this point to be rewritten. The events with regard to which there exists the most doubt are certainly those which have been observed by the greatest number of persons. To say that a fact has been simultaneously verified by thousands of witnesses is to say, as a rule, that the real fact is very different from the accepted account of it.
It clearly results from what precedes that works of history must be considered as works of pure imagination. They are fanciful accounts of ill-observed facts, accompanied by explanations the result of reflection. To write such books is the most absolute waste of time. Had not the past left us its literary, artistic, and monumental works, we should know absolutely nothing in reality with regard to bygone times. Are we in possession of a single word of truth concerning the lives of the great men who have played preponderating parts in the history of humanity — men such as Hercules, Buddha, or Mahomet? In all probability we are not. In point of fact, moreover, their real lives are of slight importance to us. Our interest is to know what our great men were as they are presented by popular legend. It is legendary heroes, and not for a moment real heroes, who have impressed the minds of crowds.
Unfortunately, legends — even although they have been definitely put on record by books — have in themselves no stability. The imagination of the crowd continually transforms them as the result of the lapse of time and especially in consequence of racial causes. There is a great gulf fixed between the sanguinary Jehovah of the Old Testament and the God of Love of Sainte Thérèse, and the Buddha worshipped in China has no traits in common with that venerated in India.
It is not even necessary that heroes should be separated from us by centuries for their legend to be transformed by the imagination of the crowd. The transformation occasionally takes place within a few years. In our own day we have seen the legend of one of the greatest heroes of history modified several times in less than fifty years. Under the Bourbons Napoleon became a sort of idyllic and liberal philanthropist, a friend of the humble who, according to the poets, was destined to be long remembered in the cottage. Thirty years afterwards this easy-going hero had become a sanguinary despot, who, after having usurped power and destroyed liberty, caused the slaughter of three million men solely to satisfy his ambition. At present we are witnessing a fresh transformation of the legend. When it has undergone the influence of some dozens of centuries the learned men of the future, face to face with these contradictory accounts, will perhaps doubt the very existence of the hero, as some of them now doubt that of Buddha, and will see in him nothing more than a solar myth or a development of the legend of Hercules. They will doubtless console themselves easily for this uncertainty, for, better initiated than we are to-day in the characteristics and psychology of crowds, they will know that history is scarcely capable of preserving the memory of anything except myths.
3. THE EXAGGERATION AND INGENUOUSNESS OF THE SENTIMENTS OF CROWDS
Whether the feelings exhibited by a crowd be good or bad, they present the double character of being very simple and very exaggerated. On this point, as on so many others, an individual in a crowd resembles primitive beings. Inaccessible to fine distinctions, he sees things as a whole, and is blind to their intermediate phases. The exaggeration of the sentiments of a crowd is heightened by the fact that any feeling when once it is exhibited communicating itself very quickly by a process of suggestion and contagion, the evident approbation of which it is the object considerably increases its force.
The simplicity and exaggeration of the sentiments of crowds have for result that a throng knows neither doubt nor uncertainty. Like women, it goes at once to extremes.A suspicion transforms itself as soon as announced into incontrovertible evidence. A commencement of antipathy or disapprobation, which in the case of an isolated individual would not gain strength, becomes at once furious hatred in the case of an individual in a crowd.
The violence of the feelings of crowds is also increased, especially in heterogeneous crowds, by the absence of all sense of responsibility. The certainty of impunity, a certainty the stronger as the crowd is more numerous, and the notion of a considerable momentary force due to number, make possible in the case of crowds sentiments and acts impossible for the isolated individual. In crowds the foolish, ignorant, and envious persons are freed from the sense of their insignificance and powerlessness, and are possessed instead by the notion of brutal and temporary but immense strength.
Unfortunately, this tendency of crowds towards exaggeration is often brought to bear upon bad sentiments. These sentiments are atavistic residuum of the instincts of the primitive man, which the fear of punishment obliges the isolated and responsible individual to curb. Thus it is that crowds are so easily led into the worst excesses.
Still this does not mean that crowds, skillfully influenced, are not capable of heroism and devotion and of evincing the loftiest virtues; they are even more capable of showing these qualities than the isolated individual. We shall soon have occasion to revert to this point when we come to study the morality of crowds.
Given to exaggeration in its feelings, a crowd is only impressed by excessive sentiments. An orator wishing to move a crowd must make an abusive use of violent affirmations. To exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never to attempt to prove anything by reasoning are methods of argument well known to speakers at public meetings.
Moreover, a crowd exacts a like exaggeration in the sentiments of its heroes. Their apparent qualities and virtues must always be amplified. It has been justly remarked that on the stage a crowd demands from the hero of the piece a degree of courage, morality, and virtue that is never to be found in real life.
Quite rightly importance has been laid on the special standpoint from which matters are viewed in the theatre. Such a standpoint exists no doubt, but its rules for the most part have nothing to do with common sense and logic. The art of appealing to crowds is no doubt of an inferior order, but it demands quite special aptitudes. It is often impossible on reading plays to explain their success. Managers of theatres when accepting pieces are themselves, as a rule, very uncertain of their success, because to judge the matter it would be necessary that they should be able to transform themselves into a crowd.[7]
"Charley's Aunt, " refused at every theatre, and finally staged at the expense of a stockbroker, has had two hundred representations in France, and more than a thousand in London. Without the explanation given above of the impossibility for theatrical managers to mentally substitute themselves for a crowd, such mistakes in judgment on the part of competent individuals, who are most interested not to commit such grave blunders, would be inexplicable. This is a subject that I cannot deal with here, but it might worthily tempt the pen of a writer acquainted with theatrical matters, and at the same time a subtle psychologist — of such a writer, for instance, as M. Francisque Sarcey.
Here, once more, were we able to embark on more extensive explanations, we should show the preponderating influence of racial considerations. A play which provokes the enthusiasm of the crowd in one country has sometimes no success in another, or has only a partial and conventional success, because it does not put in operation influences capable of working on an altered public.
I need not add that the tendency to exaggeration in crowds is only present in the case of sentiments and not at all in the matter of intelligence. I have already shown that, by the mere fact that an individual forms part of a crowd, his intellectual standard is immediately and considerably lowered. A learned magistrate, M. Tarde, has also verified this fact in his researches on the crimes of crowds. It is only, then, with respect to sentiment that crowds can rise to a very high or, on the contrary, descend to a very low level.
4. THE INTOLERANCE, DICTATORIALNESS AND CONSERVATISM OF CROWDS
Crowds are only cognisant of simple and extreme sentiments; the opinions, ideas, and beliefs suggested to them are accepted or rejected as a whole, and considered as absolute truths or as not less absolute errors. This is always the case with beliefs induced by a process of suggestion instead of engendered by reasoning. Every one is aware of the intolerance that accompanies religious beliefs, and of the despotic empire they exercise on men's minds.
Being in doubt as to what constitutes truth or error, and having, on the other hand, a clear notion of its strength, a crowd is as disposed to give authoritative effect to its inspirations as it is intolerant. An individual may accept contradiction and discussion;a crowd will never do so. At public meetings the slightest contradiction on the part of an orator is immediately received with howls of fury and violent invective, soon followed by blows, and expulsion should the orator stick to his point. Without the restraining presence of the representatives of authority the contradictor, indeed, would often be done to death.
Dictatorialness and intolerance are common to all categories of crowds, but they are met with in a varying degree of intensity. Here, once more, reappears that fundamental notion of race which dominates all the feelings and all the thoughts of men. It is more especially in Latin crowds that authoritativeness and intolerance are found developed in the highest measure. In fact, their development is such in crowds of Latin origin that they have entirely destroyed that sentiment of the independence of the individual so powerful in the Anglo-Saxon. Latin crowds are only concerned with the collective independence of the sect to which they belong, and the characteristic feature of their conception of independence is the need they experience of bringing those who are in disagreement with themselves into immediate and violent subjection to their beliefs. Among the Latin races the Jacobins of every epoch, from those of the Inquisition downwards, have never been able to attain to a different conception of liberty.
Authoritativeness and intolerance are sentiments of which crowds have a very clear notion, which they easily conceive and which they entertain as readily as they put them in practice when once they are imposed upon them. Crowds exhibit a docile respect for force, and are but slightly impressed by kindness, which for them is scarcely other than a form of weakness. Their sympathies have never been bestowed on easy-going masters, but on tyrants who vigorously oppressed them. It is to these latter that they always erect the loftiest statues. It is true that they willingly trample on the despot whom they have stripped of his power, but it is because, having lost his strength, he has resumed his place among the feeble, who are to be despised because they are not to be feared. The type of hero dear to crowds will always have the semblance of a Caesar. His insignia attracts them, his authority overawes them, and his sword instils them with fear.
A crowd is always ready to revolt against a feeble, and to bow down servilely before a strong authority. Should the strength of an authority be intermittent, the crowd, always obedient to its extreme sentiments, passes alternately from anarchy to servitude, and from servitude to anarchy.
However, to believe in the predominance among crowds of revolutionary instincts would be to entirely misconstrue their psychology. It is merely their tendency to violence that deceives us on this point. Their rebellious and destructive outbursts are always very transitory. Crowds are too much governed by unconscious considerations, and too much subject in consequence to secular hereditary influences not to be extremely conservative. Abandoned to themselves, they soon weary of disorder, and instinctively turn to servitude. It was the proudest and most untractable of the Jacobins who acclaimed Bonaparte with greatest energy when he suppressed all liberty and made his hand of iron severely felt.
It is difficult to understand history, and popular revolutions in particular, if one does not take sufficiently into account the profoundly conservative instincts of crowds. They may be desirous, it is true, of changing the names of their institutions, and to obtain these changes they accomplish at times even violent revolutions, but the essence of these institutions is too much the expression of the hereditary needs of the race for them not invariably to abide by it. Their incessant mobility only exerts its influence on quite superficial matters. In fact they possess conservative instincts as indestructible as those of all primitive beings. Their fetish like respect for all traditions is absolute; their unconscious horror of all novelty capable of changing the essential conditions of their existence is very deeply rooted. Had democracies possessed the power they wield to-day at the time of the invention of mechanical looms or of the introduction of steam-power and of railways, the realisation of these inventions would have been impossible, or would have been achieved at the cost of revolutions and repeated massacres. It is fortunate for the progress of civilisation that the power of crowds only began to exist when the great discoveries of science and industry had already been effected.
5. THE MORALITY OF CROWDS
Taking the word "morality" to mean constant respect for certain social conventions, and the permanent repression of selfish impulses, it is quite evident that crowds are too impulsive and too mobile to be moral. If, however, we include in the term morality the transitory display of certain qualities such as abnegation, self-sacrifice, disinterestedness, devotion, and the need of equity, we may say, on the contrary, that crowds may exhibit at times a very lofty morality.
The few psychologists who have studied crowds have only considered them from the point of view of their criminal acts, and noticing how frequent these acts are, they have come to the conclusion that the moral standard of crowds is very low.
Doubtless this is often the case; but why? Simply because our savage, destructive instincts are the inheritance left dormant in all of us from the primitive ages. In the life of the isolated individual it would be dangerous for him to gratify these instincts, while his absorption in an irresponsible crowd, in which in consequence he is assured of impunity, gives him entire liberty to follow them. Being unable, in the ordinary course of events, to exercise these destructive instincts on our fellow-men, we confine ourselves to exercising them on animals. The passion, so widespread, for the chase and the acts of ferocity of crowds proceed from one and the same source. A crowd which slowly slaughters a defenceless victim displays a very cowardly ferocity; but for the philosopher this ferocity is very closely related to that of the huntsmen who gather in dozens for the pleasure of taking part in the pursuit and killing of a luckless stag by their hounds.
A crowd may be guilty of murder, incendiarism, and every kind of crime, but it is also capable of very lofty acts of devotion, sacrifice, and disinterestedness, of acts much loftier indeed than those of which the isolated individual is capable. Appeals to sentiments of glory, honour, and patriotism are particularly likely to influence the individual forming part of a crowd, and often to the extent of obtaining from him the sacrifice of his life. History is rich in examples analogous to those furnished by the Crusaders and the volunteers of 1793. Collectivities alone are capable of great disinterestedness and great devotion. How numerous are the crowds that have heroically faced death for beliefs, ideas, and phrases that they scarcely understood! The crowds that go on strike do so far more in obedience to an order than to obtain an increase of the slender salary with which they make shift. Personal interest is very rarely a powerful motive force with crowds, while it is almost the exclusive motive of the conduct of the isolated individual. It is assuredly not self-interest that has guided crowds in so many wars, incomprehensible as a rule to their intelligence — wars in which they have allowed themselves to be massacred as easily as the larks hypnotised by the mirror of the hunter.
Even in the case of absolute scoundrels it often happens that the mere fact of their being in a crowd endows them for the moment with very strict principles of morality. Taine calls attention to the fact that the perpetrators of the September massacres deposited on the table of the committees the pocket-books and jewels they had found on their victims, and with which they could easily have been able to make away. The howling, swarming, ragged crowd which invaded the Tuileries during the revolution of 1848 did not lay hands on any of the objects that excited its astonishment, and one of which would have meant bread for many days.
This moralisation of the individual by the crowd is not certainly a constant rule, but it is a rule frequently observed. It is even observed in circumstances much less grave than those I have just cited. I have remarked that in the theatre a crowd exacts from the hero of the piece exaggerated virtues, and it is a commonplace observation that an assembly, even though composed of inferior elements, shows itself as a rule very prudish. The debauchee, the souteneur, the rough often break out into murmurs at a slightly risky scene or expression, though they be very harmless in comparison with their customary conversation.
If, then, crowds often abandon themselves to low instincts, they also set the example at times of acts of lofty morality. If disinterestedness, resignation, and absolute devotion to a real or chimerical ideal are moral virtues, it may be said that crowds often possess these virtues to a degree rarely attained by the wisest philosophers. Doubtless they practice them unconsciously, but that is of small import. We should not complain too much that crowds are more especially guided by unconscious considerations and are not given to reasoning. Had they, in certain cases, reasoned and consulted their immediate interests, it is possible that no civilisation would have grown up on our planet and humanity would have had no history.
提要：
1. 群体的冲动、易变和暴躁。所有令人激动的外界因素都对群体起支配作用，并且反映出它们不间断的变化——群体所服从的冲动是如此的专横就好比是要湮灭个人利益的感受——群体不会预先思考——种族的影响。
2. 群体是易受暗示和轻信。群体对暗示的唯命是从——在群体的思想中唤起的形象能够被他们看作现实并且接受——为什么这些形象对于那些组成一个群体的个人来说都是一模一样的呢？——一个群体中有学识的人和无知的人的平等——群体中的个人被幻觉所控制的具体实例——同群体的证据相符的信仰的不可能性——无数目击者的一致同意是在构建一个真相当中最糟糕的证据之一——历史巨作的毫无价值性。
3. 群体情绪的夸张与单纯。群体绝不会承认怀疑或是不确定性，而且，它们总会走一些极端——它们的情感总是过剩的。
4. 群体的偏执、专横和保守。造成这些情感的原因——群体在面对强大权利时的卑躬屈膝——群体暂时的革命本能并不能阻止他们极端的保守——群体本能地反对改变和进步。
5. 群体的道德。依照他们的所作所为得出的暗示可以看出，群体的道德观或许会比组成群体的个人更低劣，或者更高尚——解释和例子——群体很少被利益的考虑所指引，这些利益大多都是被孤立的个人所特有的动机——群体的道德净化作用。
在用笼统的方式说明了一下群体的主要特点之后，我们再来详尽地学习一下这些特点。
需要指出的是，群体之中有不少特殊的特点，例如冲动、急躁、理性的匮乏、缺乏判断和批判精神，情感的夸大，以及其他特点——这些特点通常能够在属于低级的进化形式的物种中观察到，举个例子，比如女人、野蛮人和孩子。但是，这一类比我只是说说而已；对于这一观点的阐述并不在这部著作的讨论范围内。况且，这对于那些熟知原始人心理学的人来说毫无用处，也很难让那些对于这一问题全然不知的人深信这一点。
现在，我开始按照次序对能够在大多数群体中观察到的不同的特点进行逐一的分析。
1.群体的冲动、易变和暴躁
当我们研究一个群体最基本的特点的时候，我们阐述了这些特点几乎全部由无意识的动机引导。它的行为受到的来自脊髓神经的影响要比大脑的影响还要深远。在这样的情况下，一个群体同原始的物种十分相似。从行动的施展情况来看，他们表现得非常出色，不过，他们不是受大脑支配的，个人是在刺激因素的影响下来决定自己的行动。所有令人激动的外界因素都对群体起支配作用，并且反映出他们不间断的变化。刺激是群体的奴隶。被孤立的个人或许会像群体里的人一样服从于同样的刺激因素，但是，他的大脑会把被冲动指示的不明智之举展现在他的眼前，因此，他会约束自己不受其他因素的控制。从生理学的观点来讲述这样的事实就是：被孤立的个人拥有掌控自身反射作用的能力，而一个群体则缺少这样的能力。
依照他们的刺激因素来看，那些群体所服从的变化的冲动或是慷慨的或是残酷的、大无畏的或是懦弱的，但是，他们总会虔诚地认为，个人的利益，甚至是自我保护的利益并不会主宰他们。作用在群体上的刺激因素有很多种，而群体总是服从于它们，因此，群体会变得极端易变。这就能够解释我们发现他们在一段时间里从最残忍的残暴转变为最为极端的慷慨和英雄主义。一个群体或许可以轻而易举地扮演一个刽子手的角色，却很难扮演一个烈士的角色。群体为了保证每一种信仰的胜利，不惜滋养了鲜血的洪流。我们没有必要回到英雄的年代去观察什么样的群体具备后面所说的那种方向的特质。在革命暴动中，他们从来不会珍惜自己的生命，就在不久之前，一个突然之间名声大噪的将军[8]，可以轻而易举地发现有成百上千的士兵会为了他的号令，随时准备牺牲自己的生命。
因此，群体是不可能做出任何的预先设想的。他们或许会接连受到最对立的情感的激发，但是他们总是会受到刺激因素的影响。他们就好像是暴风吹卷起来的树叶，向各个方向散播，然后落下来。当我们随后在研究某些革命性的群体时，我们会给出它们情感可变性的例子。
一个群体不仅仅是冲动的、具有可变性的。它就像是一个野蛮人，并没有准备好承认任何介于渴望和实现渴望之间的事情。它并不具备理解类似这样的介入的能力，因此，在数目上的力量的袒护下，它会认为自己具有不可抗拒的力量。不可能性的概念在群体中的个人的思想里消失了。一个被孤立的个人完全清楚光靠他自己是不可能放火烧掉宫殿，或是抢劫一家商店，倘若他被诱惑所驱使，那么他也能够很轻易地抗拒这股诱惑。不过在成为群体的一分子之后，他能够意识到被数字所给予的力量，这已经完全能够让他产生杀人抢劫的想法，而且会在一瞬间屈服于这样的诱惑。一个始料未及的阻碍会被狂热的激动情绪所摧毁。倘若人类的有机体允许永恒的狂热激情存在的话，那么我们或许可以说，那些愿望受到阻拦的群体所创造的正常状态，就会是这种狂热激情的状态。
种族最基本的特点包含了那些来自我们所有情感源泉中一成不变的资源，它总会对群体的易怒施加影响，它也往往会对它们的冲动、可变性产生影响，就好比它会影响到我们将要研究的大众情感一样。毫无疑问，所有的群体总是会易怒和冲动，但是，不同的群体之间的程度会有所不同。举个例子，一个拉丁种族的群体和一个英国人的群体之间的区别是显而易见的。在近来法国历史上发生的一些事情为这一观点带来了生动的说明。25年前，单单一份关于某位大使可能受到侮辱的电报浮出水面，就足以令群众群情激奋，随后，立刻引发了一场可怕的战争。几年之后，一份关于谅山无关紧要的失败电报引发了争论，并且令政府在一瞬间就被推翻了。与此同时，英国的远征部队在喀土穆遭遇到更为严重的失败，却只在英国本土产生了轻微的情绪，甚至就连政府官员都没有被轰下台。世界上各个地方的群体都具有女性的特点，但是，拉丁群体是所有群体中女性特点最为出众的一个。但凡任何信任它们的人，都会很快获得崇高的使命。不过这样做，等于无止境地在悬崖峭壁上漫步，终有一天会跌入深渊。
2.群体的易受暗示和轻信
我们在定义群体的时候曾经说过，它们最为普遍的特点之一就是非常容易受到别人的暗示，我们还展示了在所有的人类群聚中暗示的传染性到底能达到什么样的程度；这个事实解释了一个群体在确定的方向上情感的快速转变。然而，一个群体或许会认为这无关紧要，群体通常都会处在一种渴望被其他人注意的状态之中，这会致使它很容易被暗示。最初被指定出来的暗示，在传染的过程当中，迅速地进入到群体所有成员的大脑之中，群体情感的相同倾向会很快成为一个既成事实。
正如所有处于暗示影响下的人的例子那样，那些进入大脑的想法倾向于将它们自己转化为行动。无论这样的行动是放火烧掉宫殿，或是自我牺牲，群体都会为此赴汤蹈火。这全都要取决于刺激因素的特性，而不再像是孤立的个人那样，在被暗示驱使的行动和所有理由之间的关联，后者或许会极力阻止这一行动的实现。
因此，一个群体会永久地盘旋在无意识的边界之上，随时准备服从于所有的暗示，表现出对理性的影响毫不感兴趣的生物所特有的暴力情感，它们被剥夺了进行批评的能力，除了能够极易轻信于别人之外一无是处，要想理解那些被最不可能实现的传奇、故事创造和传播的能力，我们有必要将这一情况熟记于心。[9]
传说之所有能够在群体里轻易地得到传播，不仅仅是因为它们极易被轻信的缘故，还因为事件在人群想象的作用下，发生了非凡的曲解的结果。在群体的观察之下，最为简单的事件也会很快得到彻底的改变。一个群体是用形象来进行思考的，这些形象本身立刻就会产生其他一系列的形象，而这些新产生的形象跟第一个形象之间没有任何的逻辑关联。我们能够通过在脑海中思考任何事物所产生奇幻的连续的想法，来感知这一思想状态。我们的理论向我们展示，在这些形象之间不存在任何的连贯性，但是一个群体却会完全忽视这一事实，并且将由曲解的想象力所引发的幻觉同真实的事件混淆在一起。一个群体很少能够将主观和客观区分开来。它会接受从脑海中被唤起的形象是真实的说法，尽管，这些景象同被观察到的真相之间往往只有微不足道的关系。
一个群体曲解任何事件的方式，看上去似乎种类繁多而且彼此之间各不相同，因为组成群体的个人都拥有着非常不同的脾气秉性。但是事实并非如此。作为互相传染的结果，曲解的作用是相同的，它在群体的个人中间呈现出了相同的形态。
一个群体中的某一个个人对真相的首次曲解，是传染性暗示的起点。在耶路撒冷墙画上的圣乔治呈现在所有十字军士兵的面前之前，那些出现在现场的人们中间肯定有一个人首先感受到了他的存在。在暗示和互相传染的力量的作用下，一个由个人捏造出来的奇迹，很快就会被所有人接受。
这样的群体幻想的机制总是频繁地出现在历史当中——那些幻想看起来像是具备所有有组织性的真实特点，因为它们是被成千上万的人所观察到的现象。
要想争论之前所阐述的观点，组成一个群体的个人的思维特点就不能被考虑进去。这一品质没有什么重要性可言。从他们组成一个群体的那一刻起，那些有学识的人就跟那些无知的人一样不具备观察的能力。
这种理论看起来似乎有点自相矛盾。倘若想除去人们心中的质疑，那么调查为数众多的历史真相就变得必不可少，想要达到这个目的，即便写下数部著作也是不够的。
而且，我并不希望将那些读者置于尚未证实的断言的感想之下，因此，我想给他列举几个例子，它们都是从被引入的为数众多的事例中随机挑选出来的。
下面的事实是它们当中最为特殊的一个，因为，它是从成为受害者的群体的集体幻觉中被挑选出来的，从最无知的人到最有学识的人都可以找到它的踪迹。凑巧的是，一位海军上尉朱利安·费利克斯在他的著作中《海流》之中提到了这一事实，《科学杂志》在之前也曾经援引过这一事件。
护航舰“贝勒·波拉”号在一片公开的海域上航行着，意图寻找在一场猛烈的暴风中同它分开的巡洋舰“波索”号。那是一个太阳光很充足的白天。突然之间，巡逻的海员发现了一个失事船只发出的求救信号；顿时船上所有的人都朝着发出信号的地方看去，包括军官和海员，都能够清晰地看到一个由小船拖动的载着许多人的木筏船，好一幅令人绝望的情景。然而，这一景象只不过是一种集体的幻觉。
德斯弗斯上将将一条小船放到了海里，准备去营救失事船只上的船员。就在快要接近失事船只的时候，船上的水手和军官看到了“许许多多活着的人，他们纷纷伸出手臂，听到了由许多声音制造出来的沉闷、令人感到困惑的噪音。”当小船上的人到达目标所在地的时候，他们发现这个所谓的失事船只不过就是一些覆盖着树叶的树枝而已，这些树叶都是从附近的海岸上冲刷过来的。当这一迹象变得容易被察觉之前，幻觉就消失了。
在这一例子当中，我们所解释的关于集体幻觉的机制是完全行得通的。一方面，我们拥有一个处于希望引起别人注意的状态的群体，另一方面，是一个被巡逻的海员编造的在海上发现失事船只信号的暗示，一个处于相互传染过程的暗示，被在场所有人包括军官和船员都能接受的暗示。
将眼前所发生的事情进行曲解，用与毫不相干的事物代替真正的事实，当一个群体里出现类似这样的情况，数量众多并不是必须的。只要少数的个人聚集在一起，组成一个群体，即使他们都是非常有学识的人，在那些涉及他们的特长之外的地方一样会呈现出群体所特有的特征。观察的能力，在每个人独立存在的时候才有的批判性精神很快就会消失。一个有独创性的心理学家达维先生，为我们提供了一个同我们现在所谈论的问题相关，令人感到非常好奇的例子，近期的《心理学年鉴》援引了这一事例。达维先生将一群非常出众的观察家聚到了一起，在他们这些人当中有最杰出的英国科学家之一华莱士先生，在允许他们检查物体，并且依照他们的意愿做上标记之后，达维先生在这些人的面前展示了精神现象也就是灵魂显化的过程，并且让他们记录下来。在这些杰出的观察家陆陆续续写下记录之后，他们一致承认这些所展示的现象只能通过超自然的方法才能获得，然后，达维先生告诉他们，这些现象不过都是一些超级简单的小把戏作用的结果。《达维先生的研究中最令人吃惊的特点》的作者写道：“这些小把戏本身并不是那么令人感到惊叹，而是那些亲眼目睹的外行人所记录的报告是如此极端的不真实。那么，这很明显，”他说道，“人数众多的目击者们或许也会给出完全不正确的条件关系，但是结果是，如果他们的描述被看作是准确的表述的话，他们所描述的现象就不能用骗局去解释。由达维先生发明的方法非常的简单，人们对于达维先生竟然有如此的勇气去实践这样的方法感到颇为震惊；不过他拥有凌驾于群体思维之上的力量，他能够去说服他们看到一些没有看到的事物。”我们碰到的还是催眠师控制被催眠者的力量。由此可见，在高度秩序的大脑下，在预先持怀疑态度的人当中，这一能力也能够发挥应有的作用，那么，它可以轻易欺骗普通的群体，也就不足为怪了。
类似的例子还有很多。就在我写下这些字句的时候，报纸上满篇刊载的都是两个小女孩被发现在塞纳河溺死的新闻。有五六个目击证人用最稳妥的方式认出了这两个女孩。他们所有的证言都完全一致，没有给预审法官的思想里留下任何怀疑的空间。他草拟了死亡证明，不过就在这两个小女孩将要被埋葬的时候，一个不起眼的机遇让人们发现这两个女孩还活着，而且，她们同溺水身亡的小女孩的特征没有什么相似的地方。如同在前面所引用的例子一样，第一个目击者的证词，他所看到的是一个遇难者的假象，他还把这一影响带给了其他的目击者。
在类似这样的事情当中，暗示的起点总是由一个或多或少拥有模糊回忆的个人所产生出的幻觉，随即产生的传染性则是这一最初的幻觉假象的结果。如果第一个观察者是一个极端易受影响的人，他完全会坚信他所发现的尸体就在他的面前——除了所有真实的类似处之外——她的身上呈现出了一些特别的特征，一处伤疤，或是一些让其他人能够产生共鸣的细节。因此，那个能够产生的共鸣就会成为一种肯定过程的中心，它会入侵人们的理解力，让所有的批判能力瘫痪。那么，观察者所看到的将不再是目标本身，而是在他的脑海里唤起的形象。在这件发生在过去的事件，最近又被报纸重提的新闻当中，可以用这种方法解释为什么孩子的亲生母亲会认错自己的孩子。在这样的情况下，一定可以找出我之前所指出的两种暗示。
其他的孩子认出了这个孩子，但是他搞错了。于是，未经许可的一系列辨认过程便开始了。
一件非常离奇的事情发生了。就在一个上学的孩子认出了尸体的第二天，一个妇女大叫道：“我的上帝啊，这是我的孩子！”
她被带到了尸体的旁边，她检查了衣服，并且发现了尸体额头上的一处伤疤。“我很确定，”她说道，“我的儿子在去年的七月份失踪了，他被人拐走，而且被杀害了。”
这个妇女是福尔街的看门人，姓夏凡德雷。她的表弟也被叫了过来，当被提问时，他说道，“他就是小费利贝。”许多住在福尔街的人都认为这个在拉弗莱特找到的孩子就是费利贝·夏凡德雷，在这些人当中，有一个人是这个小男孩的校长，他根据孩子随身佩戴的一枚奖章认出了他。
“不过，邻居们、表弟、校长，还有那位妇女都搞错了。六个星期之后，这个孩子身份被查明了。他是波尔多人，他在这里被人杀害了，并且被人运送到了巴黎。”[10]
值得注意的是，这样的辨别大体上通常是由妇女和孩子做出来的——准确地说就是，这些人是最容易被影响的人。与此同时，他们还向我们展示了这类的目击证人在法庭上到底具有什么样的价值。特别是对于孩子而言，永远也不应该听信他们的证言。地方法官有反复说孩子是不会说谎话的习惯。即使他们拥有普通的心理文化，他们也会知道的，与此相反，孩子们总是在说谎，毫无疑问，这样的谎言是无辜的，但是，谎言就是谎言。用投硬币的方式决定一个被指控的人的命运，要比用一个孩子的证言的方式决定好得多。
让我们回到群体的观察能力的话题上来吧。我们的结论就是，他们的集体观察是极其荒谬的，他们经常会表现出一个个人的幻觉，那个人在相互传染的过程当中，暗示了他的伙伴们。事实真相证明，必须理智地认为群体的证言极端荒谬，它甚至会达到无限叠加的程度。就在25年前的色当战役中，上千人参加到了举世闻名的骑士进攻当中，不过面对那些最为矛盾的视觉证词时，想要知道到底是由谁领导这场战役，几乎是不可能的事情。英国的将军沃尔斯利爵士在近来的一本书当中证实，有关于滑铁卢战役中最为重要的事件，迄今为止，一些人还在犯着最为严重的错误——这是上百名目击证人从未证实的真相。[11]
类似这样的事实向我们表明，群体证词真正的价值所在。逻辑性的论述能够获得为数众多的目击证人的一致赞同，所以，它算是支持一个真相的准确性最强有力的证据。然而就我们所了解的群体心理学向我们展示逻辑性的论述需要对这一观点进行重新编写。那些关于存在最多怀疑的事件肯定是那些被最多的人观察的事件。一般来说，一个事实同时被数千名目击证人证实，就是说，事实的真相同被人们所接受的解释截然不同。
从上面阐述的事实得出的明确结果是，历史的产物必须被看作是纯粹想象的产物。它们是被错误观察的真相做出的稀奇古怪的描述，并且伴随由进行思考所作出的解释。编写一本这样的书，无疑是对时间最绝对的浪费。倘若我们的过去并没有给我们留下文学、艺术，以及不朽的工程的话，那么我们就绝对不会知道跨越时间的真相。关于那些在人类的历史上扮演重要角色的伟人们的生活，例如赫拉克利特、释迦牟尼或穆罕默德，我们没有任何的真实记录。但是，从事实的观点来看，他们真正的日常生活对我们来说，并没有什么重要性可言。我们的利益就是去知道、去了解，当他们被传奇巨星展现出来的时候，我们的伟人到底是什么样子的。传奇的战马，而不是暂时真实的烈马。并且它还能影响群体的思想。
很不幸的是，尽管神话被记录在了书里面——从他们的身上来看，并没有好动型的特点。群体的想象力还在继续转变着他们，这是时光流逝，特别是种族因素的关系引发的矛盾。《旧日约全书》中无比残暴的耶和华与圣德肋撒爱的上帝有着截然不同的区别，在中国受到崇拜的佛祖，与印度人所尊奉的佛祖并没有什么太多的共同点。
英雄的传说会被群体的想象力改变，将英雄从我们身边分离开并不是很有必要，类似这样的改变只需要几年的时间。
在我们的时代里，我们见证了历史上最为伟大的英雄的传说在短短不到五十年的时间里被改编了数次。依照诗人所说，在波旁王朝的统治之下，拿破仑成为一个具有田园风光的，热爱自由的慈善家，一个出身卑微的朋友注定要在很长一段时间里，留存在农民的记忆里。30年之后，这位性格随和的英雄成为一个血腥残暴的暴君，他在篡夺了王位，摧毁了自由之后，不惜牺牲整整三百万人的生命来满足他自己的野心。现在，我们正在见证传说的一个新生的转变。当来自未来的有学识的人经受数个世纪之前的影响，同这些矛盾的论述面对面，他们或许会质疑这位英雄是否存在，就如同现在有些人质疑释迦牟尼一样，他们只是把他看作是一个光芒耀眼的神话，或是赫拉克利特式传说的发展。毫无疑问，他们会用这样的不确定性毫不费力地安慰自己，因为在群体的特点和心理学方面来讲，他们要比现在的我们理解的更加透彻。他们知道历史只具备保留有关神话的记忆的能力。
3.群体情绪的夸张与单纯
无论一个群体所表现的出来的感觉是好还是坏，它们都会呈现出非常简单并且非常夸大的双重特点。从这一点来看，就如同许多其他的方面一样，一个群体里的个人非常近似于原始的生物。他无法做出细致入微的区别，他会把看到的事物看作是一个整体，并且观察不到事物中间过渡的阶段。一个群体情感的夸大会被另一个事实所加强，那就是，无论任何感觉，一旦它将自己表现出来，通过暗示和互相传染的过程快速地散播，那些明确赞许目标的力量就会得到大幅度的加强。
群体情感的天真和夸大是由一群人不清楚质疑和不确定性所导致的结果。就像女人一样，往往在一瞬间就会走向极端。一个怀疑会很快将自己转变成不可辩驳的证据。憎恶或是不赞许的开端，若是发生在一个被孤立的个人身上，将不会获得力量，如果对象是一个群体里的个人，则会成为狂怒的仇恨。
群体感情的暴躁，尤其是在异质性群体里面，又会因为全部责任感的缺失而得到加强。意识到犯了错误不会受到惩罚的肯定性，并且具有这样的意识的人越多，就越是肯定，由于人数众多而产生的暂时优势会让群体表现出单独的个人无法表现出的情感和行为。在群体里面，愚笨的人、无知的人，还有心存嫉妒的人挣脱了他们自身那卑微无能的感觉，而拥有了一种残暴、短暂但却无穷尽的力量。
不幸的是，这样夸大的群体倾向，往往会施加在糟糕的情感之上。这些情感是原始人类的本能隔代遗传的残留物，独立并且具有责任感的个人由于害怕受到惩罚，不得不对它们加以控制。因此，群体极易做出最糟糕、过分的坏事。
然而，这并不意味着群体无法在精巧地展现出英雄主义、奉献精神，以及最为崇高的道德品质；他们甚至要比独立的个人更有能力展示这些品质特点。当我们开始学习群体道德的时候，我们应该很快就会有机会重新谈论这一话题。
考虑到群体会夸大自己的情感，一个群体只能被过度的情感所打动。一个演说家想要靠话语打动一个群体必须大量运用狂暴的主张。要夸大、要肯定、不断重复，绝不要尝试用论证的方法证明任何事物——这些都是做公共讲演的演说家众所周知的论证方法。
具体点说，一个群体在自己的英雄的情感面前，也会展现出类似这样的夸大效果。英雄所展现出来的品质和美德总是被群体所夸大。有人在之前就已公正地指出，观众会要求出现在舞台上的群体表现出在日常生活中未曾见到的勇气、道德和优质品质。
观察剧场里事物的特殊立场，确实是非常具有重要性的。毋庸置疑，这样的立场是真实存在的，但是，从大体上来看，它的原则同它的常识和逻辑之间并没有任何关联。毫无疑问，吸引群体的艺术确实是品位低俗，但是它却要求非常特别的倾向。通常，通过阅读剧本来解释该戏的成功落幕是不可能做到的。一般来说，当剧院的经理在接到戏剧的时候，他们并不能确定该戏能否成功，原因是要想评判这件事，他们必须要将自己转变成观众。[12]
《查理的姑妈》被所有的剧院拒绝了，最终，在一个股票经纪人的资助下才被搬上舞台，结果该剧在法国演了两百场，在伦敦更是演出了超过一千场。如果没有上面提到过的对剧院经理在精神上将自己转变为观众的不可能性的解释的话，类似这样对有能力的、最不愿意犯下如此大错的个人的判断错误将会是无法用言语去解释的。这是一个我现在无法处理的话题，但是，它或许会引诱一个熟知剧院事务的作家的笔，与此同时，那个作家还是一位敏感的心理学家，举个例子，比如，弗朗西斯科·沙塞。
这里，我们再一次能够开始进行更加宽泛的解释了，我们应该展示种族因素占据压倒性优势的影响力。一部能够煽动起一个国家群体的热情，但是，在另外一个国家就不能做到，或者，只能取得部分、传统的成功，因为它并没有产生能够令一个对发生改变的公众发生作用的影响力。
我无须补充，群体对夸大的倾向只呈现在情感的领域里，完全没有影响到智力，我之前已经展示过，一个个人一旦成为一个群体的一员，他的智商水平就会立刻展现出开始大幅度下滑的事实。塔德是一位很有学识的地方法官，他同样在对犯罪群体进行的研究中证实了这一点。群体只有在涉及情感的方面，智商才会变得非常之高，或是恰恰相反，降到非常低的程度。
4.群体的偏执、专横和保守
群体只能够认识到简单和极端的情感；关于意见、想法和信念暗示，他们要么全部接收，要么完全拒绝，把其看作是绝对的真相，或是绝对的谬见。运用暗示的方法去引诱而不是通过论证的方法来产生真相。对宗教信仰的不宽容，以及其对人民群众施加的暴政统治是所有人都深知的共识。
对由什么构成了真相或是谬论持怀疑态度，另一方面，又明确地抱有自己的力量无比强大的信念，一个群体便开始给自己的灵感和偏狭施加权威性的作用。一个个人或许会接受矛盾和争论；一个群体却永远也不会接受。在公共的演说下，一个演说者即使是作出最微不足道的反驳，也会立刻收到狂怒的吼叫以及狂暴的恶言谩骂，在一片驱赶的声音中，演说者很快就会节节败退，假设在场没有能够起到约束作用的权威代表的话，那么这个敢于反驳的演说者通常就会被打死。
独断专行和偏执在所有种类的群体中都非常普遍，但是，群体与群体之间的强度变化却非常的大。这里，我们再一次指出，种族最基本的概念会控制人类所有的情感和所有的想法。尤其是在拉丁的群体当中，我们能够看到独断专行和偏执会发展到相当高的程度。事实上，这两种特点在拉丁群体里的发展，完全摧毁了盎格鲁-撒克逊人那种无比强大的独立情感。拉丁群体只能考虑到属于他们自己教派的集体独立性，他们对于独立有独特的见解，认为需要令那些同自己的意见产生分歧的人迅速反对自己的信念。在拉丁的种族之间，自宗教法庭时代以来，任何一个时期的雅各宾人都未曾有能力去获得一种截然不同的自由概念。
独断专行和偏执是群体具有明确概念的两种情感，人们能够轻易地产生这样的情感，而且如果有人在它们之间施加影响的话，它们时刻都会将其付诸实践。群体会对力量展现出顺从的尊敬，却几乎无法被良好的善意所打动，这样的情感对于他们来说无非就是一种懦弱的表现形式。他们的同情之心永远也不会服从于性情随和的主人，而是那些镇压他们，无比残忍的暴君。他们总是会为那些暴君建起最为崇高的雕像。他们愿意践踏那些被他们剥夺了力量的暴君，不过那是因为他失去了他的力量，他在跌落神坛之后，成为软弱的草民，人们会开始鄙视他，因为人们不再害怕他了。受到群体敬仰的英雄往往都是像恺撒一样的人。他的荣誉吸引着他们，他的权威令人们感到无比敬畏，他的宝剑令人们感到无比畏惧。
一个群体总是时刻准备反抗懦弱的人，并且卑微地跪拜在一个强大的权威面前。如果一个权威的力量总是断断续续的，群体就会经常展现出极其极端的情感，从毫无秩序到卑躬屈膝，再从卑躬屈膝到毫无秩序。
但是，如果你相信群体中的革命本能占据着压倒性的优势的话，那么你就完全曲解了他们的心理学。这不过是他们对于暴力的倾向，使得我们在这一点上被欺骗了。他们那反叛、具有毁灭性的爆发总是非常短暂的。群体被无意识的因素牢牢地控制着，因此它极其容易服从于世俗的世袭制，这不可避免地会极端保守。对他们放任自流，他们很快就会厌倦于混乱的秩序，并且从本能上倾向于卑躬屈膝。当波拿巴镇压了所有的自由，并且令所有的人民都能够感受到他的铁血手腕的时候，那些用尽最大力气欢呼的正是最令人感到骄傲、最难以驾驭的雅各宾人。
如果一个人没有充分地考虑群体的保守本能的话，那么想要了解历史是非常困难的事情，特别是举世闻名的革命。他们渴望改变他们朝代的名字，为了实现这些改变，他们有时甚至会发动狂暴的革命，这一点都不假，但是，这些制度的实质表达了种族对于世袭制的要求，因此，它们不大可能得不到种族的服从。他们不间断的易动性只会把其影响力施加在非常浅显的事情上。事实上，他们拥有的保守本能和所有原始的物种一样坚不可摧。他们对所有传统的迷恋就如同尊敬一样是绝对的；他们对于能够改变他们存在的基本条件的一切新生事物都有着非常深刻的无意识的尊敬。在机械纺织机的发明或是蒸汽动力和铁路的引进之前，如果民主派人士拥有着现在的力量，那些这些发明创造将不可能实现，或是会在革命和不断重复的人类大屠杀的代价下，被发明出来。从文明的发展进程来说，非常幸运的是，当科学和工业的伟大发现已经开始被运用的时候，群体的力量才开始出现。
5.群体的道德
倘若“道德”这个词意味着持续地对某些社会的传统，自私冲动的永恒镇压表现出尊敬的话，那么很明显，群体太冲动，太容易变化，因此它不能算在道德的范畴之内。但是，如果我们把暂时所呈现出来的道德与品质，例如，舍己为人、自我牺牲、公正无私、全身心奉献，以及对平等的渴求，加入到“道德”内容里面的话，我们或许会说群体会时不时地表现出非常崇高的道德品质。
少数研究过群体的心理学家只会考虑到他们的犯罪行为，并且会时刻注意这样的行为到底有多频繁，他们会得出群体的道德标准非常低的结论。
毋庸置疑，这样的案例是时常出现的，可是，这是为什么呢？这不过是因为我们的野蛮、具有破坏性的本能是我们从原始祖先那里继承而来，它就潜伏在我们的体内。在独立的个人的生活当中，满足于这样的本能是十分危险的，当他融入一个完全不用负责的群体时，因为他心里清楚自己不用为犯了错误买单，所以，他就有完全的自由去运用它们。在平日的生活当中，我们无法将这些具有毁灭性的本能运用在我们的同伴身上，于是我们局限自己将这些本能运用在动物们的身上。这样的激情是如此的普遍，群体捕猎的追逐和行为有着相同的根源。一个群体慢慢地屠杀了一个毫无抵抗能力的受害者会表现出一种非常懦弱的凶猛；但是对于哲学家来说，这种凶猛，同数十个聚集在一起的猎人用他们的猎犬追捕和屠杀一只倒霉的小鹿来获得欢乐，有着非常密切的联系。
一个群体或许会犯下杀人放火的罪行，以及各种各样的罪行，但是它同样还具备非常崇高的奉献、自我牺牲、公正无私的行为。的确，这样的行为要比独立的个人所具备的行为更加崇高。呼吁光荣、荣誉和爱国主义的情感，尤其能够影响组成一个群体的个人，通常能够达到令他牺牲自己生命的程度。类似十字军远征和1793年的志愿者那种事例，历史上还发生过很多次。集体主义具备伟大的公正无私以及伟大的奉献的能力。群体为了几乎一无所知的信仰、想法和零散的话语，就会大无畏地面对死亡！这样的例子实在是数不胜数。持续抗议的群体为的是服从于一个命令，而不是提升一点能够维持生存的薪水。个人的利益几乎就是独立的个人所独有的行动动机，却极少会成为群体强大的行动动机。可以断定的是，在群体的智力无法理解的诸多战役中，统领群体的绝对不是自我利益——在这场战争中，他们心甘情愿让自己被轻易地屠杀掉，就像是被猎人施了催眠术的云雀一样。
即使是在绝对卑鄙无耻的恶棍中，这样的例子也会经常出现，他们仅仅因为自己是一个群体的成员，就会在短暂的一段时间里用非常严格的道德原则要求自己。泰纳让人们注意到了一个真相，“九月大屠杀惨案”的实施者将被害者身上的笔记本和珠宝都放在了委员会的桌子上，类似这样的东西他们应该很容易就能拿走的。在1848年的大革命当中，那些咆哮着、聚集在一起、衣衫褴褛的群体入侵了杜伊勒利宫，但是，他们并没有拿走那些令他们既兴奋又惊奇的物品，而是拿走了其中能够让他们撑过数日的面包。
群体对个人的这种道德净化作用，并不是定向规律，而是一种经常被观察到的规律。它甚至能够在比我刚刚援引的例子还要严肃的情况之下被观察出来。我在之前指出过，剧院里的群体要求舞台上的英雄拥有无比夸大的道德品质，在习以为常的观察中可以看出，一个集会，即使所包含的成员品质极其低俗，但是他们也会表现得过分正经。放荡不羁的人、拉皮条的人和粗人在危险性最轻微的场合或是叙述中会发出低声的抱怨，尽管同他们惯常的交谈相比较而言，这样的方式是不带有任何恶意的。
如果，群体咎由自取降低他们的本能，他们还同样为崇高道德的行为树立了榜样。如果，公正无私、顺从和对一个现实或是空想的理想表现出绝对的奉献精神是道德品质的话，那么我们或许可以说，群体通常会拥有这样的道德品质，并且达到最聪慧的哲学家都很难获得的程度。毋庸置疑，他们在无意识的情况之下，会去实践这些道德品质，不过这些都无伤大雅。我们不应该太抱怨群体过多被无意识的因素所引导，从而无法做出合理的论证。在某些特定的情况之下，他们倘若能够进行论证并且考量一下当下的利益的话，那么我们的星球上就不可能培育出任何文明，人类将不会拥有任何的历史。