第4章

THE IDEAS, REASONING POWER, AND IMAGINATIONOF CROWDS 群体的观念、推理与想象力

1. The ideas of crowds. Fundamental and accessory ideas — How contradictory ideas may exist simultaneously — The transformation that must be undergone by lofty ideas before they are accessible to crowds — The social influence of ideas is independent of the degree of truth they may contain.

2. The reasoning power of crowds. Crowds are not to be influenced by reasoning— The reasoning of crowds is always of a very inferior order — There is only the appearance of analogy or succession in the ideas they associate.

3. The imagination of crowds. Strength of the imagination of crowds — Crowds think in images, and these images succeed each other without any connecting link —Crowds are especially impressed by the marvellous — Legends and the marvellous are the real pillars of civilisation — The popular imagination has always been the basis of the power of statesmen — The manner in which facts capable of striking the imagination of crowds present themselves for observation.

1. THE IDEAS OF CROWDS

WHEN studying in a preceding work the part played by ideas in the evolution of nations, we showed that every civilisation is the outcome of a small number of fundamental ideas that are very rarely renewed. We showed how these ideas are implanted in the minds of crowds, with what difficulty the process is effected, and the power possessed by the ideas in question when once it has been accomplished. Finally we saw that great historical perturbations are the result, as a rule, of changes in these fundamental ideas.

Having treated this subject at sufficient length, I shall not return to it now, but shall confine myself to saying a few words on the subject of such ideas as are accessible to crowds, and of the forms under which they conceive them.

They may be divided into two classes. In one we shall place accidental and passing ideas created by the influences of the moment: infatuation for an individual or a doctrine, for instance. In the other will be classed the fundamental ideas, to which the environment, the laws of heredity and public opinion give a very great stability; such ideas are the religious beliefs of the past and the social and democratic ideas of to-day.

These fundamental ideas resemble the volume of the water of a stream slowly pursuing its course; the transitory ideas are like the small waves, for ever changing, which agitate its surface, and are more visible than the progress of the stream itself although without real importance.

At the present day the great fundamental ideas which were the mainstay of our fathers are tottering more and more. They have lost all solidity, and at the same time the institutions resting upon them are severely shaken. Every day there are formed a great many of those transitory minor ideas of which I have just been speaking; but very few of them to all appearance seem endowed with vitality and destined to acquire a preponderating influence.

Whatever be the ideas suggested to crowds they can only exercise effective influence on condition that they assume a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape. They present themselves then in the guise of images, and are only accessible to the masses under this form. These imagelike ideas are not connected by any logical bond of analogy or succession, and may take each other's place like the slides of a magic-lantern which the operator withdraws from the groove in which they were placed one above the other. This explains how it is that the most contradictory ideas may be seen to be simultaneously current in crowds. According to the chances of the moment, a crowd will come under the influence of one of the various ideas stored up in its understanding, and is capable, in consequence, of committing the most dissimilar acts. Its complete lack of the critical spirit does not allow of its perceiving these contradictions.

This phenomenon is not peculiar to crowds. It is to be observed in many isolated individuals, not only among primitive beings, but in the case of all those — the fervent sectaries of a religious faith, for instance — who by one side or another of their intelligence are akin to primitive beings. I have observed its presence to a curious extent in the case of educated Hindoos brought up at our European universities and having taken their degree. A number of Western ideas had been superposed on their unchangeable and fundamental hereditary or social ideas. According to the chances of the moment, the one or the other set of ideas showed themselves each with their special accompaniment of acts or utterances, the same individual presenting in this way the most flagrant contradictions. These contradictions are more apparent than real, for it is only hereditary ideas that have sufficient influence over the isolated individual to become motives of conduct. It is only when, as the result of the intermingling of different races, a man is placed between different hereditary tendencies that his acts from one moment to another may be really entirely contradictory. It would be useless to insist here on these phenomena, although their psychological importance is capital. I am of opinion that at least ten years of travel and observation would be necessary to arrive at a comprehension of them.

Ideas being only accessible to crowds after having assumed a very simple shape must often undergo the most thoroughgoing transformations to become popular. It is especially when we are dealing with somewhat lofty philosophic or scientific ideas that we see how far-reaching are the modifications they require in order to lower them to the level of the intelligence of crowds. These modifications are dependent on the nature of the crowds, or of the race to which the crowds belong, but their tendency is always belittling and in the direction of simplification. This explains the fact that, from the social point of view, there is in reality scarcely any such thing as a hierarchy of ideas — that is to say, as ideas of greater or less elevation. However great or true an idea may have been to begin with, it is deprived of almost all that which constituted its elevation and its greatness by the mere fact that it has come within the intellectual range of crowds and exerts an influence upon them.

Moreover, from the social point of view the hierarchical value of an idea, its intrinsic worth, is without importance. The necessary point to consider is the effects it produces. The Christian ideas of the Middle Ages, the democratic ideas of the last century, or the social ideas of to-day are assuredly not very elevated. Philosophically considered, they can only be regarded as somewhat sorry errors, and yet their power has been and will be immense, and they will count for a long time to come among the most essential factors that determine the conduct of States.

Even when an idea has undergone the transformations which render it accessible to crowds, it only exerts influence when, by various processes which we shall examine elsewhere, it has entered the domain of the unconscious, when indeed it has become a sentiment, for which much time is required.

For it must not be supposed that merely because the justness of an idea has been proved it can be productive of effective action even on cultivated minds. This fact may be quickly appreciated by noting how slight is the influence of the clearest demonstration on the majority of men. Evidence, if it be very plain, may be accepted by an educated person, but the convert will be quickly brought back by his unconscious self to his original conceptions. See him again after the lapse of a few days and he will put forward afresh his old arguments in exactly the same terms. He is in reality under the influence of anterior ideas, that have become sentiments, and it is such ideas alone that influence the more recondite motives of our acts and utterances. It cannot be otherwise in the case of crowds.

When by various processes an idea has ended by penetrating into the minds of crowds, it possesses an irresistible power, and brings about a series of effects,opposition to which is bootless. The philosophical ideas which resulted in the French Revolution took nearly a century to implant themselves in the mind of the crowd. Their irresistible force, when once they had taken root, is known. The striving of an entire nation towards the conquest of social equality, and the realisation of abstract rights and ideal liberties, caused the tottering of all thrones and profoundly disturbed the Western world. During twenty years the nations were engaged in internecine conflict, and Europe witnessed hecatombs that would have terrified Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane. The world had never seen on such a scale what may result from the promulgation of an idea.

A long time is necessary for ideas to establish themselves in the minds of crowds, but just as long a time is needed for them to be eradicated. For this reason crowds, as far as ideas are concerned, are always several generations behind learned men and philosophers. All statesmen are well aware to-day of the admixture of error contained in the fundamental ideas I referred to a short while back, but as the influence of these ideas is still very powerful they are obliged to govern in accordance with principles in the truth of which they have ceased to believe.

2. THE REASONING POWER OF CROWDS

It cannot absolutely be said that crowds do not reason and are not to be influenced by reasoning.

However, the arguments they employ and those which are capable of influencing them are, from a logical point of view, of such an inferior kind that it is only by way of analogy that they can be described as reasoning.

The inferior reasoning of crowds is based, just as is reasoning of a high order, on the association of ideas, but between the ideas associated by crowds there are only apparent bonds of analogy or succession. The mode of reasoning of crowds resembles that of the Esquimaux who, knowing from experience that ice, a transparent body, melts in the mouth, concludes that glass, also a transparent body, should also melt in the mouth; or that of the savage who imagines that by eating the heart of a courageous foe he acquires his bravery; or of the workman who, having been exploited by one employer of labour, immediately concludes that all employers exploit their men.

The characteristics of the reasoning of crowds are the association of dissimilar things possessing a merely apparent connection between each other, and the immediate generalisation of particular cases. It is arguments of this kind that are always presented to crowds by those who know how to manage them. They are the only arguments by which crowds are to be influenced. A chain of logical argumentation is totally incomprehensible to crowds, and for this reason it is permissible to say that they do not reason or that they reason falsely and are not to be influenced by reasoning. Astonishment is felt at times on reading certain speeches at their weakness, and yet they had an enormous influence on the crowds which listened to them, but it is forgotten that they were intended to persuade collectivities and not to be read by philosophers. An orator in intimate communication with a crowd can evoke images by which it will be seduced. If he is successful his object has been attained, and twenty volumes of harangues — always the outcome of reflection — are not worth the few phrases which appealed to the brains it was required to convince.

It would be superfluous to add that the powerlessness of crowds to reason aright prevents them displaying any trace of the critical spirit, prevents them, that is, from being capable of discerning truth from error, or of forming a precise judgment on any matter. Judgments accepted by crowds are merely judgments forced upon them and never judgments adopted after discussion. In regard to this matter the individuals who do not rise above the level of a crowd are numerous. The ease with which certain opinions obtain general acceptance results more especially from the impossibility experienced by the majority of men of forming an opinion peculiar to themselves and based on reasoning of their own.

3. THE IMAGINATION OF CROWDS

Just as is the case with respect to persons in whom the reasoning power is absent,the figurative imagination of crowds is very powerful, very active and very susceptible of being keenly impressed. The images evoked in their mind by a personage, an event, an accident, are almost as lifelike as the reality. Crowds are to some extent in the position of the sleeper whose reason, suspended for the time being, allows the arousing in his mind of images of extreme intensity which would quickly be dissipated could they be submitted to the action of reflection. Crowds, being incapable both of reflection and of reasoning, are devoid of the notion of improbability; and it is to be noted that in a general way it is the most improbable things that are the most striking.

This is why it happens that it is always the marvellous and legendary side of events that more specially strike crowds. When a civilisation is analysed it is seen that, in reality, it is the marvellous and the legendary that are its true supports. Appearances have always played a much more important part than reality in history, where the unreal is always of greater moment than the real.

Crowds being only capable of thinking in images are only to be impressed by images. It is only images that terrify or attract them and become motives of action.

For this reason theatrical representations, in which the image is shown in its most clearly visible shape, always have an enormous influence on crowds. Bread and spectacular shows constituted for the plebeians of ancient Rome the ideal of happiness, and they asked for nothing more. Throughout the successive ages this ideal has scarcely varied. Nothing has a greater effect on the imagination of crowds of every category than theatrical representations. The entire audience experiences at the same time the same emotions, and if these emotions are not at once transformed into acts, it is because the most unconscious spectator cannot ignore that he is the victim of illusions, and that he has laughed or wept over imaginary adventures. Sometimes, however, the sentiments suggested by the images are so strong that they tend, like habitual suggestions, to transform themselves into acts. The story has often been told of the manager of a popular theatre who, in consequence of his only playing sombre dramas, was obliged to have the actor who took the part of the traitor protected on his leaving the theatre, to defend him against the violence of the spectators, indignant at the crimes, imaginary though they were, which the traitor had committed. We have here, in my opinion, one of the most remarkable indications of the mental state of crowds, and especially of the facility with which they are suggestioned. The unreal has almost as much influence on them as the real. They have an evident tendency not to distinguish between the two.

The power of conquerors and the strength of States is based on the popular imagination. It is more particularly by working upon this imagination that crowds are led. All great historical facts, the rise of Buddhism, of Christianity, of Islamism, the Reformation, the French Revolution, and, in our own time, the threatening invasion of Socialism are the direct or indirect consequences of strong impressions produced on the imagination of the crowd.

Moreover, all the great statesmen of every age and every country, including the most absolute despots, have regarded the popular imagination as the basis of their power, and they have never attempted to govern in opposition to it "It was by becoming a Catholic, " said Napoleon to the Council of State, "that I terminated the Vendéen war. By becoming a Mussulman that I obtained a footing in Egypt. By becoming an Ultramontane that I won over the Italian priests, and had I to govern a nation of Jews I would rebuild Solomon's temple." Never perhaps since Alexander and Cæsar has any great man better understood how the imagination of the crowd should be impressed. His constant preoccupation was to strike it. He bore it in mind in his victories, in his harangues, in his speeches, in all his acts. On his deathbed it was still in his thoughts.

How is the imagination of crowds to be impressed? We shall soon see. Let us confine ourselves for the moment to saying that the feat is never to be achieved by attempting to work upon the intelligence or reasoning faculty, that is to say, by way of demonstration. It was not by means of cunning rhetoric that Antony succeeded in making the populace rise against the murderers of Casar; it was by reading his will to the multitude and pointing to his corpse.

Whatever strikes the imagination of crowds presents itself under the shape of a startling and very clear image, freed from all accessory explanation, or merely having as accompaniment a few marvellous or mysterious facts: examples in point are a great victory, a great miracle, a great crime, or a great hope. Things must be laid before the crowd as a whole, and their genesis must never be indicated. A hundred petty crimes or petty accidents will not strike the imagination of crowds in the least, whereas a single great crime or a single great accident will profoundly impress them, even though the results be infinitely less disastrous than those of the hundred small accidents put together. The epidemic of influenza, which caused the death but a few years ago of five thousand persons in Paris alone, made very little impression on the popular imagination. The reason was that this veritable hecatomb was not embodied in any visible image, but was only learnt from statistical information furnished weekly. An accident which should have caused the death of only five hundred instead of five thousand persons, but on the same day and in public, as the outcome of an accident appealing strongly to the eye, by the fall, for instance, of the Eiffel Tower, would have produced, on the contrary, an immense impression on the imagination of the crowd. The probable loss of a transatlantic steamer that was supposed, in the absence of news, to have gone down in mid-ocean profoundly impressed the imagination of the crowd for a whole week. Yet official statistics show that 850 sailing vessels and 203 steamers were lost in the year 1894 alone. The crowd, however, was never for a moment concerned by these successive losses, much more important though they were as far as regards the destruction of life and property, than the loss of the Atlantic liner in question could possibly have been.

It is not, then, the facts in themselves that strike the popular imagination, but the way in which they take place and are brought under notice. It is necessary that by their condensation, if I may thus express myself, they should produce a startling image which fills and besets the mind. To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know at the same time the art of governing them.

提要：

1. 群体的观念。最基本的以及附属的观念——彼此相矛盾的观念是如何同时存在的——崇高的观念在经受转变之后，才能被群体所接受——观念的社会影响力与它所可能包括的真相的程度是没有关联的。

2. 群体的理性。群体并不能被推理所影响——群体的推理总是处在一种非常低俗的位置——他们所接受的观念只有相似性或是接续性。

3. 群体的想象力。群体会用形象去进行思考，这些形象之间并没有任何的联系——群体尤其会受到不可思议的事情的影响——传奇和不可思议的事迹是文明真正的支撑物——公众的想象力通常都是政客力量的基础——能够用事实激发群体的想象力的方式。

1.群体的观念

我们在之前的一本著作中提出了观念在各国发展的影响这一话题，每一个文明都是少数几个基本观念的产物，这些观念很少能够得到更新。我们指出，这些观念在群体的思维中是多么的稳固，要想对这一过程产生影响是多么的困难，当它一旦实现之后，拥有力量的观念就会受到质疑。最终，我们看到，伟大的历史波动，一般来说，是这些基本观念的改变。

我们已经用非常充足的篇幅阐述了这一课题，我现在不想再重复了，但是，我现在想说几句关于群体能够接受观念的这一话题，以及他们感受观念的方式。

他们或许会被分成两大类。其中一类是由时刻的影响产生的偶然的、短暂的观念，例如那些对个人或是教条的痴迷。另一类则是基本的观念，环境、世袭制的法律，以及公众的言论都给予了它非常良好的稳定性；这样的观念就是过去的宗教信仰，以及今天社会和民主的观念。

这样的基本观念同一条小溪里面的水流非常相似；短暂的观念就像是微小的水浪，永远都处在变化之中，它会搅动水的表面，并且要比小溪流动的过程还要显而易见，尽管它并不具备真正的重要性。

现在，那些伟大的基本观念都是我们的先父视为不可动摇的主流思想，它们正在摇摇欲坠。它们已经失去了所有的稳定性，与此同时，那些构建在它们之上的制度也受到了极其严重的动摇。每一天，在这里都会形成很多我之前有提到过的短暂的观念；但是，在它们当中只有极少的观念可以获得活力，并且具备占据压倒性优势的影响力。

无论提供给群体的观念是什么，它们都只有在被看作是非常绝对、坚定，并且简单的条件下，才能施展具有效力的影响力。因此，它们出现在形象的假象之下，并且只能被隐藏在这一形式的大众所接受。这些类似形象的观念同任何类似性或是接续性的逻辑纽带都无任何关联，它们之间可以相互替代，就像是操纵者从早期幻灯机中抽出叠放在一起的幻灯片一样。这解释了为什么能够看到大多数的矛盾观念会同时在群体中盛行。依照时机的变化，一个群体会处在理解力的范畴内众多观念中的一个观念的影响之下，并且，因此具备做出非同凡响的事情的能力。群体完全缺乏具有批判的精神，所以它们无法感知到这些矛盾的存在。

这样的现象并不是群体所特有的。在很多独立的个人身上也能够观察到这样的现象，不单单能够在原始的物种身上，还包括在智力的某个方面接近原始物种的人，比如一个具有宗教信仰的狂热的宗派成员。我曾经观察过，在我们这些欧洲的大学受过教育，并且获得了学位的印度人身上，就曾令人惊奇地表现出了这样的现象。一些西方的观念叠加在了那些无法改变、基本的世袭制或社会观念之上。依照场合的变化，这一种，或是另一种观念就会呈现出来，而且还会伴随有相应的行为和言语，在这样的情况之下，同一个个人会表现出令人难以容忍的矛盾。这些矛盾要比真相更加显而易见，因为只有世袭制的观念才会对独立的个人产生足够的影响，并且成为他的行为动机。只有当一个人在不同种族的混杂的作用之下，而处于不同世袭制倾向当中，他的行为会时不时地呈现出完全矛盾的状态。尽管这些心理学的重要性非常重要，但是，在这里过多重视这些现象是徒劳的。我的观点是，要想对这些现象有一个深刻的理解，花费至少十年时间用于旅行和观察是尤为必要的。

观念只有在被转变为非常简单明了的形式，才能被广大的群体所接受，想要变得广受大众欢迎，就必须经受最为彻底的转变。尤其是，当我们处理一些崇高的哲学或是科学的观念时，我们会看到，它们为了把自己降到群体智商的程度，需要作出何等影响深远的修改。这些修改取决于群体的天性，或是群体所属的种族的天性，但是它们的倾向总是带有观念的贬低化和简单化。这些能够解释，从社会的观点来看，现实中很少有类似世袭制的观念的事实——也就是说，级别有高低之分的观念。无论一个观念起初有多么的崇高或是多么的低俗，那些包含等级和伟大的因素，仅仅从进入到群体的智商范围，并且对他们起到了作用，就会被剥夺殆尽的事实。

但是，从社会的观点来看，一个观念的等级制价值，它的固有的价值，是微不足道的。值得需要考虑的一点就是，随之产生出来的效果。中世纪的基督教徒的观念，上个世纪的民主观念，或是现在的社会观念，都称不上是高尚的观念。从哲学的观点出发去考虑，它们只能被看作或多或少存在缺陷的错误，然而，它们的力量却是无穷无尽的，在未来很长的一段时间里，它们都将会是决定国家行为最必不可少的因素。

即使当一个观念经受了转变，成为能够被群体所接受的观念，它也只能在进入到无意识的领域，成为一种情感——这需要很长的时间，才能产生影响，在其中所产生的种种过程，我们将在下文进行阐述。

我们万万不能认为，仅仅是因为一个观念的公正性能够被证实，就会产生富有效力的行为，甚至被有文化修养的思维所接受。我们可以看一下最清晰的证据能够给大多数人带来多么微不足道的影响，就能够很快证明这一事实。如果证据非常清晰，它或许会被有教养的人接受，但是，那些信徒们会很快被他自我的无意识状态带回到原有的概念之中。过去几天之后，再看他，他依旧会用完全相同的观点阐述他之前的论证。在现实中，他仍旧处在一个被以往观念的影响下，它们已经变成了情感，只有这样的情感影响着我们的行为和言语中最为隐秘的动机。群体的情况也不例外。

当一个观念通过多种方式，最终贯穿到群体的思维当中，拥有了不可抵抗的力量，带来了一系列的影响，那么同它作对就显得毫无用处。在法国大革命中产生的哲学观念花费了将近一个世纪的时间才被灌输进群体的思维之中。一旦它们站稳了脚跟，它们不可抗拒的力量就会变得家喻户晓。整个国家对于社会公正性的苦苦追求，抽象权利和理想的自由的实现，动摇了所有的王权，并且深刻地搅乱了整个西方世界。在二十年的时间里，各个国家都处在两败俱伤的冲突之中，欧洲见证了甚至令成吉思汗见了都会发颤的大屠杀，这个世界还从未见证过因为一种观念的散播，从而导致如此巨大规模的惨痛史实。

观念要想建立在群体的思维之中，需要相当长的一段时间，但是，要想从他们的思维中去除这样的观念也需要同样长的时间。所以，从观念来看，群体总是走在几代有学识的人和哲学家的后面。所有的政客都能很好地意识到今天包含在我在之前提到过的基本观念之中的错误，不过这些理念的影响力依然十分强大，它们不得不依据它们停止信仰的真相的法则去进行统治。

2.群体的理性

我们不能绝对地说，群体没有理性，并且也不能够被理性所影响。

然而，他们所能接受的论证，那些能够影响他们的论证，从一个逻辑的观点来看，属于一种低俗的论证，因此把它描述成理性，只是说是一种比喻。

就如同一个高级的论证一样，较为低级的群体理性也是以观念为基础的，但是在由群体所持有的观念之中，只有显而易见的类比或是接续的纽带。群体论证的模式同爱斯基摩人的非常相似，他们从亲身体验中得知，冰是一种透明的物质，放在嘴里就会融化；他们又如同野蛮人一样，通过想象自己吃掉一个勇敢的敌人的心脏来获得他的胆量；或是，一些工人被雇者剥削，立刻认为所有的雇佣者都会剥削他们手下的劳工。

群体的理性特点就是把在两者之间拥有显著关系的非同凡响的事物联系在一起，并且迅速把特殊的事物普遍化。知道如何管理群体的人，总会被提供类似这样的论证。它们是能够影响群体的唯一论证。一系列的逻辑论证是完全不能够被群体所理解的，正因为这个原因，我们可以说，他们不会推理，或是说，他们的推理是错误的，并且不受到推理的影响。在阅读演讲稿的时候，多留意一下其中的弱点，你就会感到吃惊不已，不过，它们却会对聆听它们的群体产生巨大的影响，人们已经忘记了，它们是要说服群体，而不是供哲学家阅读的。一个演说家只有在和一个群体进行非常亲密的沟通时，才能诱发能够对他们产生诱惑力的形象。只要是他能成功做到这一点，他的目标就算达到了，20卷喋喋不休的高谈阔论——这始终是思考的产物——与其这样，倒不如讲一些能够对它说服的大脑具有感召力的话语。

进一步阐述群体不具备进行论证的能力，所以，它也不能呈现出任何具有批判的精神，实属多此一举，也就是说，它并不具备辨别真相和虚假的能力，或是对任何的事物做出准确的判断能力。被群体所接受的判断，仅仅只是被强加在他们身上的判断，而从来都不是经过争论之后才做出的判断。在这一方面，也有数不尽的人无法达到群体的水平。一些意见不费吹灰之力就能够普遍被公众所接受，产生这样结果的原因是因为大部分人感觉，他们不可能依照自身的论证来形成自己所特有的意见。

3.群体的想象力

就好比论证能力匮乏的人一样，群体比喻的想象力非常强大、活跃，而且非常敏感，由一个人物、一个事件、一场事故在他们的脑海里引发的形象十分逼真，几乎全都像是真的一样。从某种程度上来说，群体就好比一个正在睡觉的人，他的论证被时间所搁置了，所以，他的大脑中能够唤起极端逼真的想象，但是，他们就算能够进行思考，这种形象也会很快就开始消散。群体既不能思考也不能论证，它们持有没有什么事情是办不到的概念，值得注意的是，通常来讲，最不可能的事情往往是最引人注目的事情。

这就是为什么事件的神奇和传奇之处往往能够给群体留下极其深刻的印象。当一个文明被分析过后，你会发现在现实当中，那些神奇和传奇的事迹给予了文明真正的支持。从历史上来看，事物的表面现象往往扮演着比现实更加重要的角色，不真实的因素总是要比真实的因素更加重要。

那些只能通过形象来进行思考的群体只能被形象所打动。只有形象才会恐吓或是吸引它们，并且成为行动的动机。

正因为这个原因，最能清晰、如实地展现出人物形象的戏剧表演，往往会对群体产生巨大的影响。在古罗马平民的眼里，面包以及壮观的表演构成了幸福的理想状态，他们已经别无他求了。在之后的时代里，这样的理想状态几乎没有发生过改变。没有什么事要比戏剧表演更能对各个种类的群体的想象力产生巨大的影响力。与此同时，所有的观众都感受到了相同的情感，如果这些情感并不是在一瞬间转变为行动，那就是因为最无意识的观众也无法忽视他是假象的牺牲品，他会开怀大笑或是悲伤落泪，都是因为那些凭空想象出来的冒险经历。然而，有的时候，由暗示所引发的情感却非常强大，它们倾向于习惯性的暗示，将它们转变为行动。我们经常能够听到这样的故事，一个著名剧院的经理只不过是演出了一个让人心情低落的戏剧，就不得不在饰演叛国者离开剧院的时候保护他，以防止他受到的对罪行感到愤愤不平的观众的恶意袭击，尽管叛国者所犯下的罪行都是凭空想象出来的。依照我的观点来看，我们在这里所看到的是群体心理状态中最为卓越的象征之一，尤其是对其施加影响的非凡表现。不真实对其施加的影响力就如同真实的一样巨大。它们具有非常明显的无法在这两者之间进行区别的倾向。

侵略者和国家的力量都是以群体的想象力为基础的。在指引群体的时候，特别要在这样的想象力上面做好工作。所有伟大的历史真相，佛教、基督教、伊斯兰教的兴起，宗教的改革，法国大革命，以及在我们生活的时代，具有威胁性的社会主义入侵，都是由群体的想象力产生的强大影响所造成的直接或者间接的结果。

而且，在任何的时代，任何的国家里，所有伟大的政治家，包括最专制的暴君，都认为群体的想象力是他们力量的基础，他们从未尝试通过同它相抗争来进行统治。拿破仑在国会上说过：“通过对天主教的革新，我终止了旺代战争。通过成为一名穆斯林教徒，我在埃及站稳了脚跟。通过成为一名信奉教皇至上的人，我赢得了意大利牧师的信任，倘若我可以去统治犹太人的国家，那么我也会重新修建所罗门的神殿。”或许自从亚历山大和恺撒以来，就从来都没有任何一个人能够很好地了解群体的想象力应该如何被影响。他毫不停歇、全身心投入的事情，就是剧烈地作用于这一想象力。他把这一点铭记在他的胜利中、他的高谈阔论、他的演讲，以及他所有的行动之中。即使是到了他临死的时候，他躺在床上，这一点依旧保存在他的思想里。

那么，应该如何影响群体的想象力呢？我们很快就会见分晓。在这里，我们仅需要说出，伟大的壮举永远也不能靠通过尝试做好智力或是论证能力的工作就可以实现的，也就是说，完全不能采取展示的方式。安东尼之所以能够成功让普通的民众揭竿而起对抗杀死恺撒的凶手，并不是通过狡猾的花言巧语，而是让人民群众能够读出他的意愿，并且用手指向恺撒的尸体。

无论猛烈刺激群体想象力的东西到底是什么，它都会以一种令人惊异，非常透彻的形式展现在我们的面前，不需要任何多余的解释，或是只伴随有几个神奇的或是神秘的真相：与此相关的事例是非常伟大的胜利，一个非常神奇的奇迹，一个臭名昭著的罪行，或是一个崇高的希望。事情必须被摆在作为一个整体的群体面前，他们的起源必须永远也不能被提及。一百个微不足道的罪行，或是不值一提的事故，永远也不会猛烈地刺激群体的想象力，然而，单个的罪行，或是单个的事故就会对它们产生非常深刻的影响，即使产生的结果远远要比那些把上百个小事故加在一起所产生的伤害还低。在几年前，流行性感冒这种疾病，单单在巴黎就导致了五千人死亡，但是这并未给群体的想象力带来任何影响。原因在于这种名副其实的大屠杀并未包含在任何可见的形象之中，而是通过每周更新的统计信息来获得的。倘若一起事故造成了五百人而并非五千人死亡，但是这一事故引发的死亡人数在同一天被提供给公众，那它就会成为颇具吸引力的事件，举个例子，如果埃菲尔铁塔轰然倒塌，就会对群体的想象力带来非常巨大的影响力。群众在没有获得新闻报道的情况之下，认为一艘穿越大西洋的蒸汽机船可能在大西洋沉没了，这一事件足足影响了群体想象力一周的时间。然而，据官方的统计数字显示，仅在1894年这一年当中，就有850艘轮船和203艘蒸汽机船在大西洋中失去了踪影。就从造成的生命和财产损失来看，这些船只的失踪要比那次大西洋海船的沉没带来的损失要大得多，但是，无论何时，群体永远也不会考虑这些连续的事故。

刺激群体想象力的并不是真相本身，而是它们产生并且被人们注意的方式。如果我可以自由发表我自己的言论的话，那么我会说，务必要对它们进行浓缩，它们会产生一种充斥思维的、令人感到惊异的形象。只要了解了影响群体想象力的艺术，就能够在同时了解到统治它们的艺术。